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A LACK OF RESOLUTION
David Zaring*
[T]here is a clear need for a new “resolution authority.”
—Paul A. Volcker

1

How few there are who have courage enough to own their Faults, or
resolution enough to mend them!
—Benjamin Franklin

2

ABSTRACT
The failure to resolve—that is, impose a quick death penalty on—enormous
financial intermediaries such as Lehman Brothers and AIG damaged the
ability of the government to respond to the financial crisis. But expanding
resolution authority to cover new systemically significant institutions—which
is one of the lynchpins of financial regulatory reform—poses a problem of
legitimacy with constitutional implications, as resolution authority is usually
exercised with almost no predeprivation process and little postdeprivation
compensation. At the same time, banking regulators have failed, every time
they have been given more resolution authority, to exercise that authority when
it is needed.
This Article reassesses resolution authority. It proposes (1) domestic
solutions to protect against government overreach and (2) an international
context to deal with the problem of underreach. First, it proposes that the
government make an ex ante public list of potentially nationalizable
institutions and, ex post, provide the owners of seized institutions a brief
window in which to buy their institutions back from the regulators who took
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Arner, Matt Bodie, Larry Cunningham, Steven Davidoff, Adam Levitin, Patricia McCoy, David Skeel,
workshops at the University of Connecticut Law School, Hong Kong University, and the Annual Meeting of
the Law and Society Association, to Paul Fattaruso, Justin Simard, and Andrew Dressel for research
assistance, and to the Zicklin Center at Wharton for research support.
1 Efforts to Control High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2010) (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, President’s
Economic Recovery Advisory Board).
2 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK 87 (Skyhorse Publishing, Inc. 2007) (1732).
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them. This proposal would add both a process check and a market check to
this most severe form of decisionmaking. At the same time, this Article also
proposes internationalizing the context of the decision to use resolution
authority by including expert multinational committees of regulators in the
decision. Because these regulators are somewhat insulated from ordinary
domestic politics, this twofold approach is more likely to encourage the
appropriate resolution of the largest institutions than any solely domestic
approach.
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 99
I. THE CURRENT LACK OF RESOLUTION ................................................ 109
A. Existing Resolution Authority and the Financial Crisis ............. 109
1. A Brief History of Resolution Authority ............................... 110
2. Resolution Authority and the Financial Crisis ..................... 117
B. The Dodd-Frank Approach ........................................................ 121
1. Broader Authority, More Sign-Offs ...................................... 122
2. How Broad Is Broad? ........................................................... 125
3. Living Wills .......................................................................... 127
II. ANTI-SEIZURE PROTECTIONS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ............. 129
A. Takings ....................................................................................... 131
B. Due Process ................................................................................ 134
C. Bias ............................................................................................. 137
III. CONSTITUTIONAL, AND EXERCISABLE, RESOLUTION AUTHORITY ..... 138
A. Protection Against Government Overreach ............................... 139
1. Making a List ........................................................................ 141
2. The Market Out .................................................................... 143
B. Prevention from Underreach ...................................................... 145
1. International Nature of the Problem ..................................... 147
2. Capacity of the International System .................................... 150
3. Operation of an International Approach ............................... 152
4. Theory and Alternatives ....................................................... 154
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 156

ZARING GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

10/5/2010 11:42 AM

A LACK OF RESOLUTION

99

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has regulated the government’s “power to destroy”
since 1819.3 But Congress and the Constitution have protected the interests of
the insolvent by permitting them fresh starts and granting them a variety of
rights through bankruptcy for even longer.4 Because debtor protection goes
hand in hand with the destruction of the interests of creditors, the fresh start
and the power to destroy have been on uneasy terms ever since.
Consider the fate of big, struggling financial intermediaries like the
Lehman Brothers and AIGs of the most recent financial crisis. During that
crisis, these institutions all but collapsed, at tremendous economic cost. They
could have been destroyed, or the government could have saved them or given
them some other sort of fresh start. This sort of fresh start might have been
accomplished by invoking its resolution authority. Resolution authority is the
polite term for seizing failing financial institutions and either shutting them
down or selling them off for the best possible price. Resolution is meant to be
implemented before contagion sets in and the institutions’ counterparties,
including customers, traders, and even competitors, also fail, either through
panic (which is not the fault of the counterparties) or poor risk management
(which is, but still may exacerbate a crisis). It is a particular kind of instant
bankruptcy, destroying the interests of some creditors quickly and
unmercifully, while giving others, especially the bank’s depositors, a fresh and
happy start.
Well-deployed resolution authority could mean that financial cataclysms of
the sort threatened by Lehman and AIG would not bother ordinary Americans;
their banking needs would be unaffected by the occasional smoothly resolved
collapse of an institution in which they may have placed their trust, along with
a dollop of high-quality deposit insurance.5 It might, at least in theory, stop
financial crises before they start.
3 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 391 (1819) (“A right to tax without limit or control,
is essentially a power to destroy.”).
4 The Constitution contains a Bankruptcy Clause granting the federal government the power to act in
bankruptcy. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Congress passed the first bankruptcy act in 1800. See Bankruptcy
Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). That statute did not provide for voluntary proceedings,
however. Congress passed the first act providing for voluntary bankruptcy in 1841 and added to the provisions
in 1867. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 11, 14 Stat. 517, 521 (repealed 1878); Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch.
9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843).
5 Ideally, resolution authority would be used, and has been used, to perfect the “weekend bankruptcy,”
in which a financial institution would fail on Friday and reopen on Monday under new management and with
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However, neither Lehman nor AIG were subjected to this sort of discipline.
Was that lack of resolution the reason why the financial crisis was so severe?
Congress and President Obama seem to think so, and in the wake of the
crisis, they have passed and signed legislation designed to enhance and
broaden the government’s power to destroy through resolution. Properly
conceived, resolution authority looks like a valuable exercise of government
power, and it is a cornerstone of the government’s ongoing efforts to keep the
financial system stable.6 But it is not a panacea, and this Article explores its
problems in the context of the other ways that the government can exercise the
power to destroy and the power to grant a fresh start.
Resolution authority’s problems are twofold. The first is that it is a power
to destroy par excellence, and those sorts of powers need to be limited—a need
particularly worth considering at a time when Congress has dramatically
expanded the government’s resolution authority through the Dodd-Frank Act
reforming financial regulation. The second is that the government, perhaps
aware of the dramatic nature of the act, has proven to be loath to exercise its
power to destroy. This Article proposes an approach that would deal with both
problems, one that differs from the new sort of authority promulgated by
Congress in Dodd-Frank. It suggests a way to cabin the power to destroy and a
way to ensure that the government exercises that power when it should.

new signs on the door. The same customers would remain in the books, however, their savings entirely intact
and their financial relationships smoothly shifted from an insolvent old institution to a solvent new one. The
cost would be borne by the institution’s old managers and owners, who would be fired or wiped out; its
nondepositor creditors, who will take a haircut; and the government, which will cover any shortfall. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has placed its guidelines for resolution authority on its website.
FDIC, DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY: BOARD RESOLUTION (2002), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
matrix/index.html.
6 Indeed, the needs and risks of resolution (or its alternative, uncontrolled bank failures) might fairly be
construed as the basis for the rest of the regulatory enterprise of banking law, including the mission to keep
banks generally “safe and sound,” the imposition of frequent examinations and visitations to ensure that
insolvency will not be a shock, and everything else that the government does to oversee financial
intermediation. As such, and in light of the recent financial crisis, resolution authority has been the subject of
a growing literature. For a view that resolution authority should be paired with a very large reserve fund, see
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case
for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund (Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 374, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636456 (proposing the expansion of
resolution authority to firms not classified as “banks” as part of a plan to address systematic failures in the
financial system); see also Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469
(2010) (criticizing increases in resolution authority for institutionalizing the use of bailouts); Onnig H.
Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank Regulation, 85 IND. L.J. 777
(2010) (calling for industry participation in resolution decisions).
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Getting resolution right is worth doing; we will have another financial
crisis, and soon. The World Bank has identified 112 episodes of systemic
banking crises in 93 countries since the 1970s, and American banking crises
appear to come along once every decade or so.7 These crises all feature
institutions that go bust seemingly overnight, all calling for resolution,
bankruptcy, or a bailout.
And the alternative to resolution reform—which in the United States
amounts to unclear resolution authority with inadequate encouragement of its
use—is an unhappy one. During the last financial crisis, the government
occasionally exhibited what the shareholders of Washington Mutual, the
largest thrift8 in the country at the time, thought was a lack of control,
demonstrated by the government’s seizing and resolving a bank when a strong
case could be made for its continued solvency.9
But mostly, it evinced what we might call a lack of resolution. In some
cases the government organized deals, on the fly, to handle insolvency, as
when the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department forced the sale of one
investment bank that they did not regulate—Bear Stearns—to a commercial
bank,10 despite a lack of obvious authority to intervene in investment banking
and through some rather extraordinary cajoling and fundraising.11 It did not
resolve this institution.
Sometimes the government simply bailed out the insolvent institution. It
did so for the credit default swap titan AIG, which it also did not resolve.12
7 See Patrick Honohan & Daniela Klingebiel, Controlling the Fiscal Costs of Banking Crises 3 (The
World Bank Dev. Research Grp. Fin. & Fin. Sector Strategy & Policy Dep’t, Policy Research Working Paper
No. 2441, 2000).
8 “Thrifts” are savings and loan institutions (S&Ls), which are obligated to devote a percentage of their
loans to financing housing.
9 See Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Largest Bank Failure, U.S. Seizes, Then Sells, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2008, at A1. For an overview of the controversy surrounding this arguably overhasty resolution, see
Felix Salmon, Revisiting WaMu, REUTERS BLOG (May 26, 2009, 2:16 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/felixsalmon/2009/05/26/revisiting-wamu/.
10 Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Sweeping Move, Fed Backs Buyout and Wall St. Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2008, at A1.
11 See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009) (describing the dealmaking process).
12 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 943 (2009); David A.
Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Boundary Games, 4 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 12 (2009). For a first draft
of the AIG bailout history, see Monica Langley et al., Bad Bets and Cash Crunch Pushed Ailing AIG to Brink,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1 (“The rot stemmed largely from losses in a unit that sold a complex kind of
derivative, called a credit-default swap, designed to protect investors against default in an array of assets,
including subprime mortgages.”).
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And it both bailed out and seized the big secondary mortgage market makers
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, placing both institutions under government
receiverships while taking over their massive debt burdens.13 The government
also bailed out most of the other large players in the financial system even
before figuring out whether they were solvent or not.14 Those bailouts, of
course, were unpopular and expensive propositions for the taxpayers,15 which
makes it all the more confusing that, as Federal Reserve Governor Daniel K.
Tarullo has observed, the government in most cases (but not for Washington
Mutual, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns) “selected the bailout option” in
lieu of bankruptcy or resolution.16
Legal constraints may have played a role in what the government did, not
that the basis for its financial sector choices was ever entirely clear. The
government might have suspected, for example, that the failure of Lehman
Brothers could be catastrophic, but concluded that it was powerless to save the
investment bank because Lehman was structured not as a “bank,” but as an
institution that owned a bank and various other subsidiaries.17 Such “holding
companies” were not obviously covered by the government’s then extant
13 See Avni P. Patel, Recent Development, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2008-2009—
The Bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 21, 21–22 (2008); Carol J. Perry,
Note, Rethinking Fannie and Freddie’s New Insolvency Regime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (2009).
14 See Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2008, at A1.
15 See Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Op-Ed., Fighting the Financial Crisis, One Challenge at a Time, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at A27.
16 Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the Institute of International Bankers
Conference on Cross-Border Insolvency Issues (Nov. 10, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/tarullo20091110a.htm.
17 On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed a plenary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Press
Release, Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Announces It Intends to File Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Petition (Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf_2008/091508_lbhi_
chapter11_announce.pdf; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape of
Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1. As a “truly global firm with over 7,000 legal entities in more than
40 countries,” Lehman’s insolvency “resulted in over 75 separate and distinct bankruptcy proceedings.” Press
Release, Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Lehman Group of Companies Signs Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol
(May 26, 2009), available at http://documents.epiq11.com/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentPk=400A7F757140-4BC3-990E-4B9733B51CF2. The number of proceedings related to the number of legal entities under
the Lehman umbrella, see id., and the Lehman bankruptcy therefore did not operate under the auspice of
Chapter 15, whereby a particular debtor would file a plenary proceeding in one jurisdiction and seek
recognition from United States courts. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1532 (2006). Note that “[t]he drafters of the
provisions seem to have contemplated that troubled brokerages [such as Lehman] would be liquidated in
Chapter 7.” Skeel, supra note 12, at 4. Lehman, however, successfully filed under Chapter 11 by using a
strategy similar to other brokerages in the past: “fil[ing] a Chapter 11 petition for its holding company, and
ke[eping] its brokerage subsidiary out of bankruptcy until it had time to move all of the customer accounts.”
Id.
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resolution authority.18 (However, this conclusion must have surprised the
shareholders of quasi-resolved similar institutions like Bear Stearns, which was
structured as a similar sort of holding company.)19
Without resolution, the government can always leave institutions like
Lehman to bankruptcy, and indeed, it did exactly that. But bankruptcy can
coincide with serious destabilization of the credit markets, as Lehman’s
insolvency did for its money market fund counterparties.20 The results of the
Lehman bankruptcy were ugly: as credit markets froze up, a money market
fund holding Lehman debt “broke the buck” and then failed, leading to a panic
in that market sector and general disappearance of commercial credit.21
Lehman’s failure also turned into a multinational mess, with parallel,

18 All of this is quite controversial as a matter of legal interpretation. See Joe Nocera & Edmund L.
Andrews, Running a Step Behind as a Crisis Raged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at A1 (presenting Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson’s argument that “the Federal Reserve could bail out Lehman with a loan only if the
bank had enough good assets to serve as collateral, which it did not”); David Zaring, Richard Posner Has
Some Questions, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 30, 2009), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/07/colleenbaker-points-me-to-richard-posners-a-list-of-questions-for-legal-academics-and-he-thinks-weve-been-remissabout-answ.html. It is unclear whether its limitations in this area are attributable to a statutory bar or the
complexity of the task. As one senior Treasury official told The New Yorker: “It’s one thing to [take over] a
car company, which isn’t relying on daily decisions by its counterparties . . . . With a financial institution, if
there were a long period of uncertainty, customers, counterparties, creditors, and trading partners would flee,
and the ultimate bill would be substantial.” Ryan Lizza, The Contrarian; Sheila Bair and the White House
Financial Debate, NEW YORKER, July 6, 2009, at 30, 34 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rachelle
Younglai & Kim Dixon, Lehman’s Fuld: Where Was Our Bailout?, REUTERS, Oct. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4954DL20081006 (noting that Fuld, the former head of Lehman
Brothers, will wonder “[u]ntil the day they put [him] in the ground . . . why [Lehman was] the only one” not to
get a bailout (internal quotation marks omitted)). The distinction has hurt regulators before. Indeed, Hal Scott
has observed that BCCI was a problem because Luxemburg, its regulator, only had oversight power over the
bank, but could do nothing about the holding company, to which the bank itself was trivial in comparison.
HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 180–81 (16th ed. 2009).
19 For the government’s view of a possible distinction between Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns at the
time of its decision, see Paulson Insists No Bailout for Lehman, DIRECTORSHIP.COM (Sept. 12, 2008),
http://www.directorship.com/paulson-insists-no-bailout-for-lehman/ (“There are two things that make this
different from Bear Stearns. The market’s been aware of the situation for a long time and has had time to
prepare. Second, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility was created by the Fed to allow time for an orderly
process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
20 This argument is controversial. Some scholars argue that, employed consistently, bankruptcy is a
desirable mechanism for culling the value from failing institutions in a cost-effective manner. See, e.g., Skeel,
supra note 12.
21 But see David A. Skeel, The Lehman Myth in the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Oct.
6, 2009, 2:00 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/dealbook-dialogue-david-skeelthe-lehmanmyth/ (“The claim that Lehman’s default caused the chaos that came afterward is similarly dubious.”).
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competing bankruptcy proceedings in the United Kingdom and the United
States.22
But the bailout option is just as unpalatable.23 Apart from its political
unpopularity, AIG initially cost the taxpayers more money than did the failure
of any other company; indeed, it has cost the taxpayers more than the annual
budgets of many beloved federal departments, such as the Departments of
Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Justice, combined.24
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together required a similar magnitude of
commitment of government resources for their bailouts.25
Resolution authority is one way to disincentive the bailout, while avoiding
bankruptcy. It could be fairer than picking winners through government
assistance, especially if it gave the government the power to resolve the largest
financial institutions.26 After all, with the exception of Washington Mutual
22 Bankruptcies do not always go smoothly. David Skeel and Kenneth Ayotte have described the
Lehman bankruptcy as promising in some ways and problematic in others. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 6,
at 481, 482 (observing that “Lehman could hardly have been less prepared for Chapter 11,” but describing
certain successes of the Lehman bankruptcy process including the fact that “faced with extreme time pressure,
buyers materialized, and Lehman quickly sold its viable subsidiaries, allowing them to remain in business
under different ownership”). Although the multinational nature of bankruptcies is often thought to be a
problem, Ayotte and Skeel describe the European aspect of the Lehman bankruptcy as workable, stating
simply that “[i]ts operations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia were bought by Nomura, a large Japanese
brokerage firm.” Id. at 481. Skeel thinks that many of the problems of bankruptcy arose because of the
expectation of a bailout. He has suggested that Lehman’s bankruptcy was largely a problem because the
rescue of Bear Stearns created expectations of a ubiquitous government safety net. See Too Big to Fail—The
Role for Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law in Financial Regulation Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (written testimony of
David A. Skeel, Jr., Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School) (“When Lehman filed for bankruptcy,
no one even knew who Lehman owed money to and who the counterparties on its derivatives contracts were.
AIG behaved in very similar fashion. These responses are perfectly understandable given both companies’
assumption—an assumption shared by nearly everyone as a result of the Bear Stearns bailout—that regulators
would rescue any big, troubled financial institution.”).
23 See Tarullo, supra note 16.
24 Alice Gomstyn, AIG Price Tag: $1,400 Per Taxpayer Family, ABC NEWS/MONEY (Mar. 2, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Economy/story?id=6990305&page=1. The government made $180 billion
available to AIG. Sharona Coutts & Paul Kiel, How Big Is AIG’s Bailout . . . Really?, PROPUBLICA (July 7,
2009, 1:46 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-big-is-aigs-bailout-really-707.
Meanwhile, the
budgets of the Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Justice, and Veterans Affairs totaled $134.7
billion as of 2010. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 85, 95, 117 (2010)
(HUD budget is $48.5 billion, Justice budget is $29.2 billion, and Veterans Affairs budget is $57 billion).
25 Lorraine Woellert & John Gittelsohn, Fannie-Freddie Fix at $160 Billion with $1 Trillion Worst Case,
BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-13/fannie-freddie-fixexpands-to-160-billion-with-worst-case-at-1-trillion.html.
26 In bailouts, by contrast, creditors get their entire investment back, while the government bears the
brunt of the failure. Consider, for instance, the government bailout of AIG. There, the equity holders went to

ZARING GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

10/5/2010 11:42 AM

A LACK OF RESOLUTION

105

and arguably Lehman Brothers, during the last crisis, large banks got bailouts,
but many smaller institutions were subjected to resolution (indeed the list of
failed institutions is well into triple digits).27
Accordingly, developing the power to take large financial firms like
Lehman Brothers or AIG through resolution without resorting to bankruptcy
court is a cardinal goal of the Dodd-Frank Act’s reform of financial regulation.
The Dodd-Frank Act has sought to prevent the government from bailing out a
failing institution.28 And, perhaps most importantly, it has dramatically
expanded resolution authority to cover the sorts of financial companies not
clearly within the ranks of regulated banks.29
But where should this expansive resolution authority end? Should the
ability to quickly nationalize and fail apply to financial intermediaries like
hedge funds? One powerful international organization of banking regulators

zero while creditors were paid out at—rather scandalously, in the view of many—100 cents on the dollar. See
Serena Ng & Carrick Mollenkamp, New York Fed Caved in to AIG Creditors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2009, at
C1.
27 Eric Dash, Small Banks Fail at Growing Rate, Straining F.D.I.C., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2009, at A1.
28 Although this Article will not discuss at length Congress’s efforts to prevent the government from
bailing out banks again, they are worth noting. For example, Congress has amended the Federal Reserve’s
ability to open its discount window to individual institutions, limiting such assistance to a “program or facility
with broad-based eligibility.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 716, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. Section 214 of the Act prohibits the use
of taxpayer funds for bailouts. Id. § 214. Further, Title XIII of the Act is titled the “Pay It Back Act” and
requires the Treasury to return the bailout money granted to it under the TARP. Id. Rather hopefully,
President Barack Obama has declared that “[b]ecause of this law, the American people will never again be
asked to foot the bill for Wall Street’s mistakes.” Ross Colvin, Obama Signs Sweeping Wall Street Overhaul
into Law, REUTERS (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66K1QR20100722.
29 The new rules on resolution authority comprise Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. For examples of
discussions of the push for more authority, see Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009)
(written testimony of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, United States Department of the Treasury), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg335.htm (“We must build a system in which individual firms, no
matter how large or important, can fail without risking catastrophic damage to the economy.”); Albert Bozzo,
US Is Seeking Tougher Powers in Too-Big-to-Fail Legislation, CNBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 2009, 12:43 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/33314791. It would be incorrect to characterize resolution authority as another
example of regulation-by-deal, though sometimes it is consummated with a deal on the fly, as was the
government’s response to the financial crisis at times. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 11 and
accompanying text. Dealmaking is private ordering, and there is nothing private about the authority invoked
by the government to wrap up failed institutions. The FDIC has a preset program, is accustomed to dealing
with failing institutions, and does not hire legal counsel to negotiate when it seizes a bank. See FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK (2003) [hereinafter FDIC HANDBOOK], available at http://www.fdic.
gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/index.html. It relies on powers explicitly granted to it by statute. See 12
U.S.C. § 1822 (2006). So seizure is not private ordering; it is instead public ordering.
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has concluded that it should.30 Market participants like private equity funds?
The European Union has proposed bringing private equity within the ambit of
prudential financial supervision—an ambit that probably would include the
power to seize and fail such institutions.31 Should job-producing commercial
companies, such as, say, auto manufacturers, be subject to resolution authority,
lest the government be tempted into expensive bailouts of its national
champions? The United States has a rich tradition of bailing out these sorts of
manufacturers; more resolution authority, it is thought, could reduce the
temptation to do so in the future.32
These examples illustrate the problems of resolution authority, including
old problems of constitutional law and the propriety of agency action. The
right way to broaden the government’s ability to destroy through resolution
would address resolution authority’s legitimacy, both as a matter of policy and
as a matter of legality. An even better solution would pair enhanced resolution
authority with restrictions that promise to protect against its misuse.
This Article argues that a revised resolution authority with a scope limited
to a list of publicly identified institutions would ensure that the government’s
power to destroy is not overly broad. Moreover, although Congress and
administrative lawyers rarely turn to markets to solve governance problems, a
market check would do a great deal of good in ensuring that resolution
authority, once deployed, is deployed for good reason and on reasoned terms.
Permitting buybacks of resolved institutions—or at least giving the owners of
those institutions the chance to make public bids—would be a salutary check
on overzealous resolution.
Better resolution authority, however, is not only a matter of potential
government overreaching. The parlous history of the exercise of resolution
authority during financial crises is also a case study of repeated government
failures to act.33 Banks not taken through the quick bankruptcy process
30 See infra notes 196–97 and accompanying text (recounting efforts of the Basel Committee to improve
resolution authority in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis).
31 Friederich K. Kübler, European Initiatives for the Regulation of Nonbank Financial Institutions 1–2
(Dec. 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (summarizing EU action in this area).
32 Phillip Longman, Washington’s Turnaround Artists, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 14, 14–18;
see also Joseph R. Mason & Daniel A. Schiffman, Too Big to Fail, Government Bailouts, and Managerial
Incentives: The Case of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to the Railroad Industry During the
Great Depression, in TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 49 (Benton E.
Gup ed., 2004).
33 Robert Teitelman, Transactions: March 8, 2010, THE DEAL (Mar. 5, 2010, 1:27 PM), http://www.
thedeal.com/newsweekly/community/transactions/transactions:-march-8,-2010.php (“Resolution authority
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overseen by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) have required
expensive bailouts, as with Continental Illinois in the early 1980s34 and Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, Citibank, and AIG during the recent financial crisis.35
Even worse, institutions that should be resolved but are not can become
“zombie banks”—insolvent but taking risks, losing lending discipline, and
piling up losses because the government is unwilling to close them. Japan’s
“lost decade” of zero growth in the 1990s often has been attributed to the
Japanese government’s failure to come to grips with the essential insolvency of
its financial sector.36 And the expense of resolution may also keep the
government from exercising its power until matters are very bad. One World
Bank study has estimated that the resolution costs of most banking crises since
1980 have amounted to more than 10% of the originating country’s GDP.37
How can we ensure that the government will exercise its resolution authority
when it ought to do so?
It is here that one of the most complicated problems of resolving a financial
institution—the cross-border problem—might illuminate the way to proceed.
The financial institutions that really matter—the ones with international
exposure, of the sort that Lehman Brothers had during the recent financial
crisis—create the prospect of incredibly complicated bankruptcies, involving
multiple jurisdictions with little reason to cooperate when dividing the assets of
a collapsed multinational.
Financial regulators have known since the 1970s that their big banks, if
they fail, can create a dangerous chain of international dominoes.38 They have

resembles proactive bubble defense: The optimal time to use it is before the anticipated corpse turns blue. But
if Paulson had shuttered Lehman right after Bear collapsed, would he be praised, pilloried or prosecuted like a
dog?”).
34 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
35 See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
36 See HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 285–91
(15th ed. 2008) (describing causes of the Japanese financial crisis in the 1990s).
37 The study arose out of the World Bank’s efforts to create a comprehensive financial crisis database.
See Honohan & Klingebiel, supra note 7 (“By one count, 112 episodes of systemic banking crises occurred in
93 countries since the late 1970s and 51 borderline crises were recorded in 46 countries.”).
38 On June 26, 1974, German regulators forced Bank Herstatt into liquidation, which left without remedy
a number of banks that had released payment of German marks to Herstatt in Frankfurt in exchange for United
States dollars that were to be delivered in New York. 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES: FROM THE AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM 1970-2001, at 20 (2001). The
British-Israel Bank, based in the United Kingdom, and the Franklin National Bank, based in the United States,
also failed. See ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, SUPERVISING INTERNATIONAL BANKS: ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
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accordingly, since that time, met in Basel, Switzerland, in an effort to
coordinate approaches to the financial externalities that would otherwise spill
across borders.39
And, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, it is with the so-called Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision that some of the furthest reaching of the
proposed financial reforms have appeared.40 For example, the possibility of
leverage caps for banks—rules that will make them smaller—have originated
with the Basel Committee rather than any domestic regulator.41 The
Committee is insulated from some of the domestic pressures that have deterred
regulators from pulling the resolution trigger. It is a place where national
regulators meet and jawbone and act like experts, rather than like captured,
chary regulators.42 And it is an institution committed to developing an
approach to cross-border insolvencies.
This Article posits that it is via this peer pressure that domestic regulators
best can be encouraged to exercise their resolution authority.43 It is only
through the Basel process of peer review and insulation from domestic
lobbying pressures44 that United States regulators will be able to force
themselves to do some of the difficult work of resolving financial institutions.

BASLE ACCORD 4–5 (1991) (discussing the history surrounding the establishment of the Basel
Committee).
39 See David Zaring, International Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 479–81
(2010) [hereinafter Zaring, Crisis Performance].
40 However, the G-20 has also been a source of such proposals. See id. at 493–99.
41 Though the Basel Committee did not cover itself in glory during the crisis, see David Zaring, Three
Challenges for Regulatory Networks, 43 INT’L LAW. 211, 215–17 (2009) [hereinafter Zaring, Three
Challenges], it has been the delegate of the G-20 for passing new tough rules on banks in the past. And even if
it is not a perfect solution to the problems of global financial crises (and the point of this Article is not to
suggest that it is), the Committee may be a place to coordinate the impetus to, in fact, exercise resolution
authority over the particularly big international financial institutions. The Basel Committee, for example, has
urged stronger leverage caps than the 15:1 ratio provided by the Dodd-Frank financial reforms. See infra note
221 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Basel Committee’s ambitions.
42 See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
43 The United States has not always embraced the Basel Committee to the fullest extent; it has
implemented the Committee’s capital adequacy accords slowly, on occasion, and strong-armed the Committee
in certain directions on others. See DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 36–66 (2007). But the SEC, for example, used Basel II for its most
sophisticated investment banks (albeit with disastrous results). For a review by the former SEC chair of the
program, see Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Chairman Cox Announces End of Congressional
Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008230.htm.
44 David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L.
547, 555–60 (2005).
THE
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It is by no means a panacea to turn to informal, relatively unregulated
international organizations to discipline domestic regulators to exercise their
strongest powers.45 But its real world advantages probably mean that this
international approach is the source of the most likely solutions to the
problems involved with getting any domestic government to exercise the
powers that it actually possesses, and then using insulation to free up the
expertise that has always been, at bottom, the justification for administrative
agencies.
In what follows, this Article first provides an overview of existing
resolution authority and considers some proposals to broaden this authority in
the wake of the financial crisis. It then considers the legal impediments to such
a broadening. Finally, it offers a solution that might ensure that resolution
authority, when deployed, is deployed usefully.
I. THE CURRENT LACK OF RESOLUTION
A. Existing Resolution Authority and the Financial Crisis
This section of the Article surveys the history and law of resolution
authority. The goals are to show how the government’s seizure powers have
evolved over time, what they look like today, and how the Dodd-Frank Act
will change them. This section also surveys the way the government actually
exercises its takeover authority, with a focus on the recent financial crisis. As
this Article demonstrates, and as the recent financial crisis exemplifies, the
FDIC, the agency responsible for taking over banks, acts procyclically. That
is, the worse the economic conditions, the more banks it fails. Although that
may be an inevitable fact, it has nonetheless been bemoaned by economists
hoping for a more countercyclical regulatory approach that might smooth out
disruptions to the financial system caused by hard times and failing
counterparties.46 Moreover, the early warning system put into place after the
last big domestic financial crisis (known as “prompt corrective action” or
“PCA” authority) was designed to cajole regulators into closing banks quickly
and more countercyclically, and to “place foam on the runway” to make
45

David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial
Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998) [hereinafter Zaring, International Law].
46 For a review of the issues and concerns, see Mariya Deryugina, Shaping Global Financial Reform: A
Symposium for Private and Public Sector Leaders, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 683 (2009); Daniel Indiviglio,
The Senate Plan’s Resolution Authority, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 11, 2009, 10:50 AM), http://www.theatlantic.
com/business/archive/2009/11/the-senate-plans-resolution-authority/29972/.
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resolution easier to do. Yet this system has not been used. Indeed, the FDIC
issued prompt corrective action orders in only 19% of the cases in which it
ultimately failed banks during 2009, the year that marks the apogee of the
recent crisis.
1. A Brief History of Resolution Authority
This subsection of the Article briefly tours some of the government’s
rescues and seizures of financial institutions before the most recent financial
crisis. It pairs past resolutions and bailouts with the statutory authority—
designed to limit the prospect of future crises—given to the government in
their aftermath.47
Today, resolution authority is managed by the FDIC.48 But the government
power that it represents stretches back much further; the seizure of property by
federal marshals, for example, or the appointment of bankruptcy trustees, dates
back to the nineteenth century.49
Apart from its longstanding ability to disempower creditors through the
complex process of bankruptcy, Congress has in the past used insolvency to
adjust the relationship between creditors and debtors in other ways. During the
Great Depression, it uniformly modified farm mortgages—a controversial
interference with the contractual rights of creditors, but one ultimately upheld

47 The FDIC received its resolution authority through the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA). 12
U.S.C. § 1819 (2006). This authority was expanded in the FDIA’s amendments, passed after the S&L crisis,
known as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. 12 U.S.C. § 1824
(2006). However, that authority is not the only basis on which the government either has exercised its power
to destroy, or elected to save, businesses. S&Ls are organizations that accept savings deposits and make
personal loans to their members. A combination of lax regulation, poor oversight, rising interest rates, risky
decisionmaking, and declining commercial real estate values caused more than 700 S&Ls to fail in the 1980s
and 1990s, as is discussed in a bit more detail later in this Article. 1 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DIV. OF
RESEARCH & STATISTICS, HISTORY OF THE 80S: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 167−88 (1997). The costs of the
collapse were massive: $160 billion with $124 billion coming from federal taxpayers. Timothy Curry & Lynn
Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. 26, 33
(2000).
48 See Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991, 12 U.S.C. § 1824 (2006).
49 Though the government’s bankruptcy power is subject to the Takings Clause, this rarely creates a
practical limitation. See generally James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’ Rights in
Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96
HARV. L. REV. 973 (1983) (discussing reasons why the Takings Clause has little real effect on the
government’s bankruptcy power).
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by the post-Lochner Supreme Court.50 And Congress occasionally has bailed
out individual debtors through legislation, making good on its obligations with
taxpayer funds. This action also has been upheld as constitutional, even when
accompanied with resolution, bankruptcy, and other pain for the creditors and
owners of the debtor.51 In addition to reorganizing (and partly nationalizing)
the nation’s rail companies, the government became involved in the aircraft
business when it rescued Lockheed in 1971 with a $250 million loan.52 It has
bailed out Chrysler twice, first at a cost of $1.5 billion in 1980 and second at a
cost of $1.6 billion in 2009.53 There is no question, then, that the power to
intervene through resolution, bailout, or bankruptcy, in a variety of ways and
as a basic matter, has been understood as within the government’s legal
powers.
But the government most often rescues or resolves banks through the
FDIC, which is the current resolver of last resort. This process has evolved
into a seizure with little process or recourse. A well-known example is
Continental Illinois, which was the seventh-largest bank in the United States
when it was both bailed out and wound up at a cost of $1.8 billion, with serious
consequences to the shareholders and employees of the institution.54

50 See Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937) (holding
that the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Moratorium Act did not unreasonably modify mortgagees’ rights and
was thus valid). The first version of this statute, however, was held to be unconstitutional. See Louisville
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935).
51 See Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
52 BARRY RITHOLTZ, BAILOUT NATION: HOW GREED AND EASY MONEY CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND
SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY 11 (2009).
53 Id. For a discussion of the second Chrysler bailout, see Martin Crutsinger, US Set to Lose $1.6b on
Loan to Chrysler, Treasury Reports, BOS. GLOBE, May 18, 2010, at B8.
54 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Continental Illinois and “Too Big to Fail,” in 1 HISTORY OF THE
EIGHTIES—LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY
1990S, at 235, 244 (1997) (“[T]hree bank regulatory agencies decided to provide a $2 billion assistance
package to Continental: the FDIC provided $1.5 billion, and participated [sic] an additional $500 million to a
group of commercial banks. The capital infusion was in the form of interest-bearing subordinated notes at a
variable rate 100 basis points higher than that on one-year Treasury bills. The Federal Reserve stated that it
would meet any liquidity needs Continental might have, and a group of 24 major United States banks agreed to
provide more than $5.3 billion in funding on an unsecured basis while a permanent solution was sought. In
what was perhaps the most controversial move by the regulators, the FDIC promised to protect all of
Continental’s depositors and other general creditors, regardless of the $100,000 limit on deposit insurance.
The assistance package was to remain in place while the regulators searched for a permanent solution to
Continental’s problems.”).
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Resolution authority was first given to the FDIC through the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA).55 This authority was enhanced after the
FDIC’s failure to make active use of that authority during the last great
financial housing crisis—the S&L crisis of the 1980s. The blame for this crisis
has been assigned to macroeconomic factors (rising interest rates at the end of
the 1970s devastated the balance sheets of thrifts locked into long-term, lowyield mortgages, often with fixed interest rates)56 and the culture of risky, even
fraudulent, behavior on the part of the thrifts themselves.57 Regulators also
failed to curtail this behavior through their ordinary supervision. The result
was an extraordinarily widespread failure rate across the thrift sector.
In response to the crisis, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), which created the
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to
clean up the savings and loan industry by restoring its health and
preventing the depletion of its deposit insurance fund. In order to
fulfill its duty of restoring liquidity to thrift associations, the RTC
takes over insolvent S&Ls, sells their assets, and distributes the
proceeds of the sales to the shareholders. The RTC’s primary goal is
to achieve the most cost-effective resolution of the S&L crisis for the
58
taxpayers.

55

12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006). Agency predecessors of the FDIC—including the Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal Asset Disposition Association (FADA)—had similar resolution
capabilities, and state financial regulators long exercised resolution authority over state banks that failed within
their jurisdictions. Bert Ely, The Resolution Trust Corporation in Historical Perspective, 1 HOUSING POL’Y
DEBATE 53 (1990).
56 Marjorie I. Stein, Student Work, Developments in Banking Law: 1993—VI: Resolution Trust
Corporation, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 57, 57–58 (1994).
57 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board—today’s Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)—referred 11,000
cases to the DOJ in 1987 and 1988. See KITTY CALAVITA ET AL., BIG MONEY CRIME: FRAUD AND POLITICS IN
THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS 27–28 (1997). By 1992, there had been 1,000 convictions and a reported
conviction rate of 91%. The U.S. Government Accountability Office concluded that, of the 26 largest thrift
failures, 60% had been marred by “serious criminal activity.” The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) said
criminal fraud was a significant contributor to the failure of 33% of its institutions. Id.
58 Stein, supra note 56, at 59. For additional background on the founding and purpose of the RTC, see
Lee Davidson, Politics and Policy: The Creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation, 17 FDIC BANKING REV.
17 (2005) (offering a detailed discussion of the RTC’s founding and extensive background on its legislative
history, as well as information about its structure and oversight); Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Norton, The
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989: Dealing with the Regulators, 107
BANKING L.J. 196 (1990) (summarizing the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989); Wayne M. Josel, Note, The Resolution Trust Corporation: Waste Management and the S&L Crisis, 59
FORDHAM L. REV. 339 (1991) (providing a general discussion of the RTC with focus on its ability to override
state banking laws).
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Between 1989 and 1995,59 the RTC took over insolvent thrifts and resolved
them slowly, funding its operations through a major grant of bailout money by
Congress and whatever assets it could take advantage of in the failed thrifts
themselves. The scale of the RTC’s actions was breathtaking. From 1986 to
1995, 1,043 thrifts failed, to the tune of over $500 billion.60 Taxpayers paid
$124 billion to insured depositors; the thrift industry put in another $29 billion
or so.61
To resolve the failed thrifts, the RTC used three methods: (1) liquidating
assets and reimbursing depositors; (2) merging, consolidating, or reorganizing
the insolvent thrift into an existing thrift; and (3) dismantling the thrift by
selling deposits to other S&Ls or banks.62 The problem faced by the RTC—
and all would-be resolvers—was that it was instructed to balance speed and the
maximization of value, on the one hand, and to resolve the S&L crisis quickly,
on the other. Such rapid resolution was often at odds with the maximization of
the value of the failed thrifts, which counseled for a degree of forbearance and
for a holding of the thrifts’ assets until the crisis blew over. Its ability to
balance the threat of getting fire-sale prices for the S&L assets against the risk
that a failed institution would never sell made the RTC a generally praised
financial regulator—but it engaged in mop-up effectiveness, rather than crisisprevention effectiveness.63
Moreover, the dealings of the RTC and federal regulators with financial
groups during the S&L crisis included resolutions that led to constitutional
litigation, though ultimately upheld by the courts.64 These resolutions
foreshadowed the problems with financial conglomerates that have made
reform of the resolution system such a high priority.
In the wake of the S&L crisis, Congress passed a statute designed to ensure
that regulators, and especially the FDIC, would not again exercise regulatory
forbearance while insolvent institutions pursued risky lending strategies.
Congress designed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement

59 Lisa L. Bonner, Student Work, Developments in Banking Law: 1995—VII: Updating FDICIA/RTC, 15
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 81, 81 (1996) (“The RTC went out of business on December 31, 1995.”).
60 Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13
FDIC BANKING REV. 26, 26 (2000).
61 Id. at 33.
62 Stein, supra note 56, at 67–68.
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., Christopher T. Curtis, The Takings Clause and Regulatory Takeovers of Banks and Thrifts,
27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367, 385–89 (1990) (describing the takeovers of First Republic and MCorp).
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Act (FDICIA) to “capitalize and protect the bank insurance funds, reform the
deposit insurance system, and improve supervision of federally insured
depository institutions, including foreign banks.”65 The centerpiece of
improved supervision was to be PCA—to force government action before
resolution.66 However, this new authority reached only banks, thrifts, and to
some degree, their holding companies, which could be relied on as “sources of
strength” for the tottering bank or thrift.67
The action-forcing aspects of the FDICIA require the FDIC to regularly
review each institution governed by its deposit insurance and assess the
adequacy of the institution’s capitalization on a scale ranging from well
capitalized to critically undercapitalized.68 The Act also requires regulators to
follow a variety of specified procedures whenever institutions fall below the
well-capitalized threshold: for instance, placing limitations on the sorts of
deposits they can accept, requiring the development of a capital restoration
plan, insisting that the institution raise more capital, requiring divestitures, and
changing the board. Institutions that remain critically undercapitalized for
ninety days must be placed into receivership or conservatorship.69 In this
sense, PCA is meant to prepare both the board of the bank and the regulator for
resolution. Other requirements imposed on the agency were designed to force
the FDIC to resolve economically. Although difficult to enforce, §1823 of the
FDICIA requires the FDIC to use the least costly methods possible in resolving
failing financial institutions and prohibited the agency from overinsuring
depositors.70
65 Stephen K. Huber, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 109
BANKING L.J. 300, 300 (1992).
66 The FDICIA gave the FDIC new PCA powers that were as much designed to require the FDIC to act
as to expand the role of the agency. See, e.g., Frederic S. Mishkin, Evaluating FDICIA, in 9 FDICIA: BANK
REFORM FIVE YEARS LATER AND FIVE YEARS AHEAD 23 (George Kaufman ed., 1997) (“Among the most
important features of FDICIA is its prompt corrective action provisions, which require the FDIC to intervene
earlier and more vigorously when a bank gets into trouble.”).
67 This is a well-known provision of the federal Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1850
(2006). See Policy Statement on the Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources of Strength
to Their Subsidiary Banks, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707 (Apr. 30, 1987). FDICIA’s adoption, however, did not mean
that all holding companies would always be dunned. See generally Wachtel v. OTS, 982 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (ruling that the government must prove reckless disregard of legal obligations or unjust enrichment to
require a holding company to pay for losses incurred by a savings bank subsidiary). The resolution authority
granted by the FDICIA did not reach shadow banks and non-banks—even systemically significant ones like
investment banks and insurance companies. And if the holding company itself is insolvent, it obviously
cannot serve as a source of strength and cannot be resolved under the FDIC’s ordinary statutory powers.
68 See Huber, supra note 65.
69 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2006).
70 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (2006).
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When it exercises its authority under the Act, the FDIC takes over a failing
bank as either a conservator or a receiver.71 A receiver simply winds up the
bank. It acts no differently than would a bankruptcy court liquidating the
assets of a failed firm, though it does so with some expertise about the
implications of failure for both individual banks and the financial system as a
whole. The difference from bankruptcy, from the FDIC’s perspective, is that
once the failed company is liquidated, it may use its insurance funds to pay the
deposit-insurance-covered creditors of the failed institution.
A conservator, on the other hand, either continues to manage the bank until
the bank is sold to a solvent institution, or creates a federally chartered bridge
financial company to hold some or all of its assets until such time as net asset
value is maximized.72 The bridge financial company is a technical innovation,
but one that the agency views as critical to the success of its resolution
program.73 Its purpose is straightforward: it is a vehicle designed to buy the
FDIC time before it is forced to dispose of an insolvent institution’s assets at a
particularly low price.74
Conservators that wind up the debts of the seized bank need not heed ipso
facto clauses in contracts (which are accelerated if the institution ever goes
bankrupt), can make the government a supercreditor, can disaffirm
“burdensome contracts” (but must pay compensation), and may generally
provide what might be called unequal treatment. That is, the conservator can
treat different creditors differently if that is deemed best for the failing
company.75 The FDIC can also provide financial assistance to these
71

12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (2006).
The new rules limit the receivership to three years, with the possibility of obtaining two more upon a
showing of necessity, as defined by the statute. See Stuart Stock et al., Dodd-Frank Act: Systemic Risk
Regulation and Orderly Liquidation of Systemically Important Firms, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 6 (July 21,
2009), http://www.cov.com/ (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “Covington E-Alert & Advisory”
hyperlink; then follow “Dodd-Frank Act: Systemic Risk Regulation and Orderly Liquidation of Systemically
Important Firms” hyperlink).
73 Bridge financial companies are an interesting legal development in their own right—the federal
government charters few corporations outside of the financial sector, and even then, it does not handle some of
the basics of the corporate form. Bridge companies are created without many formalities. Christopher
Stoakes, Marrying Venture Capital and High Yield, EUROMONEY, July 1998, at 28.
74 Id.
75 See 18 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (2006); Seth Grosshandler, Securities, Forward and Commodity Contracts
and Repurchase, Swap and Master Netting Agreements Under U.S. Insolvency Laws, in ADVANCED SWAPS
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 2009, at 181, 241 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Ser. No. 11839)
(detailing a “Conservator’s . . . Right to Disaffirm or Repudiate Contracts”). This is not the case for specialtreatment contracts. Qualified financial contracts include securities contracts, commodities contracts, forward
contracts, repurchase agreements, swap agreements, and master agreements for any of the foregoing. Mark
72
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institutions through the conservatorship, a loan, or almost any other
mechanism.76 In these cases there is little room for judicial review, except for
some protest by the seized bank and its managers and owners.77 That review is
handled on a fast track, and it has found little success.78
To handle its resolutions, the FDIC has created a Division of Resolutions
and Receiverships; its raison d’être is closing and selling banks and thrifts.79
Since 1980, approximately half of the over 3,000 occasions on which the FDIC
has offered some form of assistance to a failing bank or thrift have been
purchase-and-assumption arrangements, in which an acquiring bank purchases
the assets of an insolvent bank and assumes its obligations.80 In only about
250 of these cases has the FDIC simply closed the bank and paid the insured
depositors the value of their deposits. Bank failures, in sum, are a matter of

Roe thinks that conferring superpriority on derivatives and swaps “warp[s] the financial industry’s incentives
to avoid problems.” Mark Roe, End Bankruptcy Priority for Derivatives, Repos and Swaps, FT.COM (Dec. 15,
2009, 11:44 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16da702e-ea41-11de-aeb6-00144feab49a.html.
76 See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (2006).
77 See id. § 1821(j).
78 See id. § 1821(c)(7).
79 See Resolutions and Receivership Specialist Intern Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.
fdic.gov/about/jobs/drr/drrintern.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2010) (“Within FDIC, the Division of Resolutions
& Receiverships (DRR) is charged with resolving failing and failed financial institutions, which includes,
among other important responsibilities, ensuring depositors’ have prompt access to their insured funds.”).
80
The following chart summarizes the types of assistance offered by the FDIC:
Transaction Type
A/A
REP
P&A

PA
PI

IDT

MGR
PO
Total:

Description of Transaction Type
Assistance Transactions.
Reprivatization; management takeover with or without assistance at takeover,
followed by a sale with or without additional assistance.
Some or all of the deposits, certain other liabilities, and a portion of the assets
(sometimes all of the assets) were sold to an acquirer. It was not determined if all of
the deposits were assumed (PA) or only the insured deposits were assumed (PI).
Purchase and Assumption, where the insured and uninsured deposits, certain other
liabilities, and a portion of the assets were sold to an acquirer.
Purchase and Assumption of the insured deposits only, where the traditional P&A
was modified so that only the insured deposits were assumed by the acquiring
institution.
Insured Deposit Transfer, where the acquiring institution served as a paying agent for
the insurer, established accounts on their books for depositors, and often acquired
some assets as well. Includes asset-backed transfer, a Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) transaction that is very similar to an IDT.
An institution where FSLIC took over management and generally provided financial
assistance. FSLIC closed down before the institution was sold.
Payout, where the insurer paid the depositors directly and placed the assets in a
liquidating receivership.

Frequency of Use
588
3
178

1673
143

403

37
264
3289

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Failures and Assistance Transactions, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBSummaryRpt.asp?BegYear=2010&EndYear=1980&State=1 (last visited
Sept. 10, 2010); HSOB Help, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/Help.asp?EntryTyp=60
(last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
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mergers and acquisitions substantially more than they are simply a matter of
insurance claims adjustment.81
2. Resolution Authority and the Financial Crisis
The government has always followed a boom and bust, rather procyclical
approach to bank failures, despite the best efforts of Congress to encourage the
contrary. Its response to the recent financial crisis has been no exception.
That is, it has tended to fail institutions when times are bad, such as during the
S&L crisis of the 1980s and during the recent financial crisis, but not when
they are good. As Table 1 illustrates, the FDIC’s resolution authority bureau
all but closed up shop between 1995 and 2005, in two of those years failing no
institutions at all, and over that decade failing fewer than it did in the year
1993 alone. The slow times have changed since 2007. Although most often
evoked to deal with small banks—which were failing at a rate of about one to
nine per week during the height of the recent financial crisis82—the current
FDIC authority has worked when applied to large institutions like Washington
Mutual, which would have been the largest financial institution failure ever,
were it not for the collapses of AIG and Lehman Brothers.83

81 The recent financial crisis has tested the FDIC’s capacity for damage control. In one case, the FDIC
was forced to create a thirty-day bridge bank when it could not find a buyer. Jake Bernstein, The 30-Day
Bank, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 14, 2009, 4:04 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-30-day-bank-414. In
another case, it simply mailed checks to depositors in the amount of their insured funds. Paul Kiel, Bank
Failure Friday: 7 Banks Go Down, 3 with No Buyer, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2009, 2:12 PM), http://www.
propublica.org/ion/bailout/item/bank-failure-friday-7-banks-go-down-3-with-no-buyer-1219.
82 See Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.
html (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
83 Yalman Onaran & Christopher Scinta, Lehman Files Biggest Bankruptcy After Suitors Balk (Update
1), BLOOMBERG, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
a6cDDYU5QYyw; Robin Sidel et al., WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest Failure in U.S.
Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A1.

ZARING GALLEYSFINAL

118

10/5/2010 11:42 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

Table 1: FDIC Failures and Assistance Transactions Over Last Thirty Years84
Year
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980

Institutions
118
148
30
3
0
0
4
3
11
4
7
8
3
1
6
8
15
50
181
271
382
534
470
262
204
180
106
99
119
40
22

Failures
118
140
25
3
0
0
4
3
11
4
7
8
3
1
6
8
15
50
179
268
381
531
232
217
162
139
83
50
34
9
10

Assistance
0
8
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
3
1
3
238
45
42
41
23
49
85
31
12

As Table 1 indicates, and as Figure 1, which covers a roughly
contemporaneous period, also suggests, the FDIC fails institutions almost
84 HSOB Bank & Thrift Failures—Summary Report, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www2.fdic.gov/
hsob/HSOBSummaryRpt.asp?BegYear=2010&EndYear=1980&State=1 (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
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exclusively when times are bad for the banking system. The S&L crisis of the
1980s and the recent crisis account for most of these failures.
Figure 1: Bank Failures 1970 to November 30, 2009 (in 2005 Dollars)85

Neither the FDICIA nor PCA has mitigated this procyclical story. Indeed,
during 2009, in the depths of the crisis, the agency never subjected most of the
institutions that it failed to PCA orders. In fact, only 27 out of 140, or about
19%, of the failed banks received them. Twenty-one of these institutions were
closed without any prior notice by the agency. As Figure 2 demonstrates,
while the FDIC took an average of 66.37 days to notify those institutions that
they were in trouble through the PCA discipline, the number of days between a
PCA order and closure declined over the course of the year.

85 Figure 1 comes courtesy of the Congressional Oversight Panel. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL,
DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: TAKING STOCK: WHAT HAS THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF FUND ACHIEVED
45 (2009).
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Figure 2: The Decline in PCA Notice During the 2009 Crisis86

Days
from
PCA
Date to
Closing
Date

Date of PCA Order
The import of this record is clear enough: the FDIC did not use its PCA
authority frequently and, as the crisis deepened, increasingly elected to shrink
the time between PCA notice and seizure.
This record, which reveals that the government resolves less than Congress
hoped it would and, perhaps, too much during crises, poses some questions.
Does expanded resolution authority do any good?87 When the government did
clearly have resolution authority—most notably in its supervision of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac—the process was unable to forestall cataclysm.88 For
other resolvable banks, the FDIC has tended to act harshly when banks are at
their most vulnerable—an unsurprising fact, but one totally at odds with what
Congress and commentators have urged the agency to do.

86 The source of the data used to generate Figure 2 comes from ProPublica’s failed bank database. See
Failed Bank List, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/tables/failed-banks/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
87 This question was considered in a short editorial by the author. See David Zaring, Why Congress
Should Not Fix ‘Too Big to Fail,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2009, 6:06 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
hearing/2009/04/should_congress_fix_too_big_to.html.
88 See Louise Story, New Aid for Fannie and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at B4 (summarizing
briefly the post-crisis experience of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); Chris Isidore, Fannie & Freddie: The Most
Expensive Bailout, CNNMONEY.COM (July 27, 2009, 1:48 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/22/news/
companies/fannie_freddie_bailout/index.htm.
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B. The Dodd-Frank Approach
One way to deal with the problem of resolving financial conglomerates is
to broaden the reach of such authority, while simultaneously making a seizure
harder to authorize—for instance, by requiring a number of different officials
to sign off before it could be exercised. A broader authority would allow the
government to take over the types of conglomerates it failed to resolve during
the recent financial crisis, while the requirements of consultation would check
against the rash use of that authority. These sorts of changes appeared in the
Executive Branch’s proposals for financial reform shortly after the crisis
began, and they made their way into the final legislation.89 To check overhasty
decisions to resolve, the Dodd-Frank Act adds a sign-off from a court in
addition to internal Executive Branch consultation.90 Such proposals do not
reduce the risk of government overreach or underreach enough, as it is unlikely
that various political appointees in the same branch of government, appointed
by the same party and president, will disagree about whether to bail out
institutions. Nor does the addition of a late, fast-paced sign-off by the district
court in D.C. resolve this problem.91 Neither approach precludes rash
decisionmaking or insulates the decision to resolve from the political and
lobbying pressures that apparently have made it so difficult to exercise.
Nonetheless, the statute has many useful resolution authority features.
Importantly, it requires the government to make a list of the companies that
will be subject to resolution authority.92 As the list is only limited to the rather
broadly defined category of “financial companies,” the government reserves
the power to address new sorts of systemically important players in the
financial world.93 Thus, such a list provides flexibility while preserving a form
89

See supra Part I.A.
At the same time, the Dodd-Frank Act does not require judicial review if the resolved firm’s board
consents to the appointment of the FDIC in a resolution process. See Dodd-Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(i); see
also Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Enacted into Law on July
21, 2010, DAVIS POLK (July 21, 2010), http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413bb870-b7c025ed2ecf/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform_Summary.pdf (“Because the statute protects directors against any
liability for acquiescing or consenting to the FDIC’s appointment in ‘good faith,’ it is likely that the Treasury
Secretary will put intense pressure on boards to acquiesce or consent in order to avoid judicial review of the
appointment decision.”).
91 Dodd-Frank Act § 202 (providing for this sort of judicial review).
92 Id. § 102(a)(4)(D) (creating a category of “Nonbank financial compan[ies] supervised by the board of
governors”); § 113 (authorizing the designation of a list of such companies).
93 Dodd-Frank’s resolution powers are couched in terms of financial companies; these companies are
defined somewhat complicatedly as having activities that are “financial in nature.” For more details, see id.
§ 163(b).
90
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of notice and contestation for those companies that the government brands as
systemically significant and, therefore, subject to resolution.94 A review of the
Dodd-Frank approach to fixing resolution authority both offers insights into
different ways to conceptualize the power and provides a basis for the
evaluation of the proposal herein. Thus, this Article reviews this approach—
both as it was first articulated by the Executive Branch in its request for new
resolution authority from Congress and in its final form in the Dodd-Frank Act.
This Article also discusses the so-called “living wills” requirement of banks,
which has also found its way into the statute.
1. Broader Authority, More Sign-Offs
The Obama Administration proposed, and Congress passed, legislation
broadening federal resolution powers to “financial companies,” including nonbanks “predominantly engaged in financial activities,” holding companies of
insurers, broker-dealers, and financial holding companies as defined by the
Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA).95 Some of these companies are
automatically subject to the new resolution authority—for instance, bank
holding companies with more than $50 billion in assets—while other financial
companies would be designated by a two-thirds vote of the members of the
newly created Financial Oversight Council, comprised of the heads of the
federal financial regulators.96 Congress has also permitted the government to
raise an “orderly liquidation fund” from large banks to cover the shortfalls
possible in the event of a large insolvency.97
The new approach could—controversially—include hedge funds and
private equity shops if their equity interests qualify them as holding
94

Id. §§ 202–203 (describing the listing and review process).
Id. §§ 102(a), 113 (setting forth the considerations for making a determination that non-bank financial
companies should be overseen by the Federal Reserve, which in turn makes them eligible for resolution). For
some of the initial efforts to create a category of systemically significant institutions, see Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Proposes Legislation for Resolution Authority (Mar. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg70.htm [hereinafter Press Release, Dep’t of Treasury]. Congress
concluded that financial companies would be defined by a number of factors, including leverage,
interconnectedness, size, and the like. See Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(2) (defining, inter alia, the categories of
institution that may be subject to resolution authority); see also Shasha Dai, Still Unclear What Tier-1 FHC Is,
but at Least We Know What It Isn’t, WALL ST. J. PRIVATE EQUITY BEAT BLOG (July 23, 2009, 6:53 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2009/07/23/still-unclear-what-tier-1-fhc-is-but-at-least-we-know-what-itisnt/tab/article/; U.S. Regulatory Reform Would Impose Strict Limits on Investments and Activities of
Systemically Significant Financial Firms, CLIFFORD CHANCE, (June 18, 2009), http://www.cliffordchance.
com/publicationviews/publications/2009/06/u_s_regulatory_reformwouldimposestrictlimit.html.
96 Dodd-Frank Act § 113 (providing for a designation of “systemically significant” institutions).
97 Id. § 210(n).
95
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companies, though the Dodd-Frank Act provides a number of safe harbors for
various kinds of sophisticated or foreign investors.98 By moving away from
banks and thrifts toward a more inclusive view that encompasses companies
that own banks and bank-like institutions that serve a crucial financial role, the
proposal will, it is hoped, solve the problems created by the lack of coverage of
financial conglomerates like Lehman and AIG.
Because commercial banks and thrifts are already subject to the FDIC
resolution authority, which works differently and usually faster than the
Bankruptcy Code, the FDIC has figured prominently into the Act as the
administrator of the new resolution.99 Congress’s new grant of resolution
authority largely extends the FDIC’s resolution procedures to bank holding
companies and other designated financial companies.100 The Administration
has the power, following the FDICIA rating system described earlier, to
require more action when financial companies appear to be undercapitalized.101
The combination of some limitations on leverage, more prudential oversight of
a broader category of financial companies, and stronger resolution authority
that can be used on such companies, would, in theory, prevent chaotic failures

98

Id. § 413 (adjusting the “accredited investor” standard, the standard that exempts wealthy investors
from various sorts of SEC regulation); § 170 (permitting the Federal Reserve to pass regulations exempting
certain foreign banks from the reach of the statute). For a discussion, see “Too Big to Fail” Policy (Warning:
Long), ECONOMICS OF CONTEMPT (Oct. 20, 2009, 3:05 AM), http://economicsofcontempt.blogspot.com/2009/
10/too-big-to-fail-policy-warning-long.html. It would not apply to subsidiaries of holding companies that are
registered broker-dealers covered by their insurance scheme and insurance companies. FDIC and Capital
Financial Regulatory Reform, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/role.
html (last updated July 21, 2010).
99 See supra Part I.A. Indeed, commercial banks and thrifts are not subject to the Bankruptcy Code by
definition. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(41), 109 (2006) (defining who is a person and who may be a debtor,
respectively).
100 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 204, 210.
101 Id. §§ 165, 171. Section 171 refers to the PCA requirements when devising “leverage requirements.”
Although the Federal Reserve will devise many of the relevant details through regulation, those requirements,
if they track the FDIC’s, would particularly affect systemically significant institutions deemed
“undercapitalized,” which would largely involve more scrutiny by regulators. “Significantly undercapitalized”
institutions would receive further scrutiny; they might be sold, management might be replaced, and the
compensation of senior executive officers might change. “Critically undercapitalized” institutions would be
forced to file for bankruptcy within ninety days. These terms were devised by Congress, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831o(b) (2006), and have been implemented by regulation by the FDIC, see 12 C.F.R. § 303.200 (2008).
The idea is that the tiers of undercapitalization, which require regulators to initiate PCA, will set up the bank
for a non-chaotic failure.
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like that of Lehman Brothers by forcing regulators into action via an ordered
evaluative process.102
Resolution powers can only be deployed after an elaborate consultation
process that would eventually reach the President himself. First, the Secretary
of the Treasury would have to make a “systemic risk determination” that (1) a
financial company is in default or in danger of default, (2) the failure of the
financial company and its resolution under the Bankruptcy Code or other
applicable law would have serious adverse effects on financial stability or
national economic conditions, and (3) any actions or assistance under the
proposed legislation would avoid or mitigate such adverse effects.103 Second,
this final determination can only be made upon recommendation by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Federal Reserve Board”)
and the FDIC or the other primary regulator of the systemically significant
financial institution.104 Third, the Secretary must consult with no less than the
President himself before acting.105
And finally, the systemic risk
determination is also subject to a quick review by the D.C. district court.106
Upon making the necessary determination, the Treasury Department could
then deploy its powers of conservatorship or receivership, or employ some of
the tools used so often during the bailout: injections, asset purchases, loans,
debt assumption, and a variety of other approaches that essentially untie the
hands of the government agency. These actions would be funded by a special
assessment from the Treasury’s general funds and by special assessments on

102 As this Article emphasizes elsewhere, however, it is difficult to persuade regulators to use their early
warning system, and the recent financial crisis has been no exception. In this connection, consider the
following account:

At bank after bank, the examiners are discovering that state and federal regulators knew lenders
were engaging in hazardous business practices but failed to act until it was too late. . . . In many
instances, the financial overseers failed to act quickly and forcefully to rein in runaway banks,
according to reports compiled by the inspectors general of the four major federal banking
regulators.
Eric Dash, Post-Mortems Reveal Obvious Risk at Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at B1.
103 Press Release, Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 95, at 2.
104 Dodd-Frank Act § 203. The recommendation would advise whether the FDIC should appoint itself as
conservator or receiver of the financial company, whether and to what extent to provide the company with
assistance, and whether to take any other action. Id. The recommendation would also require the consent of
no less than two-thirds of the Federal Reserve Board and two-thirds of the board or commission of the
appropriate federal regulatory agency. Id.
105 Id.
106 Indeed, the review must be concluded within twenty-four hours. Id. § 202.
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the relevant industry sector.107 The Treasury Department may assign the
FDIC, with its considerable experience, to assist in the winding-down
process.108
All of these processes are limited by certain instructions from Congress,
designed—somewhat hopefully given the government’s track record—to
ensure that creditors and shareholders will bear the company’s losses, that
management will be replaced, and that, ideally, tax revenues will not be used
to bail out the firm.109 The government faces other restrictions as well; it
cannot take an equity interest in firms that it is inclined to resolve, for
example.110
But the fundamental strategy for resolution in the Dodd-Frank Act is clear
enough. It broadens most of the FDIC’s resolution powers to apply to a new
category of financial companies, most of which will be large bank holding
companies or financial companies designated as “systemically significant.”
2. How Broad Is Broad?
Identifying precisely where systemic risk begins is a particularly difficult
task for any proposal for financial reform. The Treasury Department has
suggested that resolution authority must be better able to reach the bank and
thrift holding companies, and that large financial services conglomerates like
AIG must face at least the theoretical prospect of seizure.111 However,
Congress has tried to keep that power canalized within the banks of relatively
formal concepts like “holding” and “financial” companies; while the latter
category is new, the Federal Reserve has long had some authority for defining
what is “financial in nature.”112 In this sense, the new authority will not only
107

Id. § 203.
There is, however, some evidence that the FDIC’s resolution authority is not working perfectly.
During the recent financial crisis, some banks failed under supervision of an FDIC program designed to
streamline the process and be less intrusive for regulated institutions. James Sterngold, FDIC’s 20% Shorter
‘Merit’ Reviews Preceded Failures (Update1), BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2009, 12:57 PM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=a3auv.3nhk.A&pos=10. Such a program is unlikely to have a
perfect record, of course, but the point is that imperfection inheres in the regulatory plan.
109 Dodd-Frank Act § 214.
110 Id. § 206.
111 See Press Release, Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 95.
112 The “canalized within banks” language is that of Justice Cardozo. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring). The “financial in nature” language is
based on a reference to § 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2006), which provides
a laundry list of the activities in which financial holding companies may engage. Dodd-Frank Act,
§ 102(a)(6). Accordingly, there would be no ability to seize and resolve hedge funds or other players in the
108
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create a list of potentially nationalizable institutions, but also a class of them,
including any institutions that meet the definition of a bank holding company
with assets over $50 billion.
Other observers have taken a broader view, one that might be characterized
as discretionary resolution authority. As the government has assumed an
increasingly active role in ensuring systemic economic stability through
resolution, it may need to consider exercising that authority not just over banks
and bank-like institutions, but also over other large and interconnected firms,
such as automakers. In other words, once important financial institutions are
potentially resolvable, it is unclear why other interconnected firms—albeit in
some respects differently interconnected—might not be similarly treated.113
And while much of the legislation following the financial crisis has been
justified by claims that the present financial situation is unique and uniquely
threatens domestic economic stability, much of the government’s action during
the crisis—bailing out the automakers, most notably—suggests that a broader
resolution tool would enable the government to avoid the bailout-orbankruptcy dilemma in other contexts.114 Moreover, in the past, many of the
government’s most expensive bailouts have gone not to financial institutions,
but to other businesses—again, most notably the automakers, but also large
defense manufacturers and the like.115
The problem with these sorts of proposals is that pure discretion to resolve
if necessary gives the government little guidance and fails to limit those
institutions that might be covered by the nationalization power. This broad

shadow financial system that are too big or interconnected to fail, unless they own federally insured thrifts or
banks and meet a certain size level.
113 They may be dissimilar for Takings Clause purposes. As Christopher T. Curtis has pointed out, “[t]he
Supreme Court has suggested that a physical occupation of private property constitutes a per se taking to
which the ad hoc, multifactor approach used in most cases of so-called regulatory takings does not apply. But
that proposition cannot apply to regulatory takeovers of banks and thrift institutions, because they are not
physical property.” Curtis, supra note 64, at 375. Automakers and other businesses that consist of plants,
parts, machinery, etc., may be subject to more careful Takings Clause scrutiny should the government care to
step in.
114 For a discussion of the auto bailouts, see University of Rochester Roundtable on Bankruptcy and
Bailouts: The Case of the US Auto Industry, J. APPLIED FIN., Fall/Winter 2008, at 97 (2009); see also Randy
Picker, Can You Put Cars Under the Tarp?, U. CHI. FACULTY BLOG (Dec. 12, 2008, 10:06:52 AM),
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2008/12/can-you-put-cars-under-the-tarp.html; David Zaring, Can the
TARP Be Pulled over Detroit?, THE CONGLOMERATE (Dec. 14, 2008), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/
12/can-the-tarp-be.html [hereinafter Zaring, THE CONGLOMERATE].
115 See, e.g., Tara Branum & Susanna Dokupil, Security Takeovers and Bailouts: Aviation and the Return
of Big Government, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 431 (2002); Longman, supra note 32, at 14–18.
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delegation of power might even implicate separation of powers problems like
those posed by the rarely invoked, but often in the background, nondelegation
doctrine.116 As such a proposal would broaden the power to destroy to a truly
wide ambit, the constraints imposed by the government are first definitional—a
class of institutions are to be affected, and no more—and second, internally
procedural—sign-offs must be obtained before power is exercised.
But by implementing procedural hurdles to constrain exercise of resolution
authority, this authority relies on internal deliberations—to which outsiders are
rarely privy—among political appointees who often have every reason to
follow the will of the administration’s leadership. Further, the very short, and
circumventable, window of review by the D.C. district court is unlikely to
change the essential nature of this inquiry. In other words, the procedural
limitations likely will not be particularly constraining.
3. Living Wills
In addition, Congress has embraced the possibility of requiring banks to
come up with so-called living wills or, as termed by Dodd-Frank, “resolution
plans.”117 This provision requires systemically significant financial companies
and bank holding companies to “report. . .the plan. . .for rapid and orderly
resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure,” including how
such a failure would affect any parts of the financial conglomerate that enjoy

116 For the canonical statements of the extent of the nondelegation doctrine and the only two cases in the
history of the Supreme Court to use it to strike down legislation, see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
117 See The Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry
Comm., 111th Cong. 1−2, 40 (2010) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation) (“Large interconnected firms should also be required to develop their own liquidation plan⎯a
living will so to speak⎯which would demonstrate that they could be broken apart and sold in an orderly
manner.”); Roshni Banker, Note, Glass-Steagall Through the Back Door: Creating a Divide in Banking
Functions Through the Use of Corporate Living Wills, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 424 (arguing that living
wills offer a preferable alternative to regulation of the scope of banking activities); Emilios Avgouleas et al.,
Living Wills as a Catalyst for Action 13 (DSF Policy Paper Series, DSF Policy Paper No. 4, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533808 (discussing living wills extensively and arguing that they could make
resolution of “cross-border financial institution[s]” easier). In theory, living wills seem to serve the dual
purposes of clarification and simplification. First, they enable easy government takeover and disassembly, as
well as force corporate transparency to facilitate earlier detection of risk. Second, they reduce what Financial
Services Authority (FSA) Chairman Adair Turner describes as “complex legal structures designed to maximize
regulatory and tax arbitrage.” Chris Giles et al., Living Wills “to Be Forced on UK Banks,” FT.COM (Sept. 14,
2009, 11:35 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4bb9fd1e-a17b-11de-a88d-00144feabdc0.html (describing
resistance from banks and suggesting that U.S. banks have assumed a more conciliatory attitude toward the
living wills issue).
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deposit insurance.118 It further requires “full descriptions of the ownership
structure, assets, liability, and contractual obligations of the company.”119
Regulations by the Federal Reserve and FDIC will set the precise content of
the wills; companies that fail to develop “credible” living wills are subject to
sanctions including, potentially, the divestiture of assets and units.120
Living wills force banks to confront their own mortality and, at their best,
can create a sort of ex ante timetable and organization chart to smooth the
ultimate task of resolution in the case of insolvency.121 Congress has required
large institutions both to make these sorts of wills and to update them
periodically.122 By requiring banks to identify their various subsidiaries to
regulators and to suggest a process that might be used to wind up those
subsidiaries, living wills could transform the real complexity that financial
institutions have utilized in the past to engage in tax arbitrage and regulatory
avoidance.123
All of this is usefully cautious, but it is also imperfect. Living wills may
make banks more risk averse—or they may not. Planning for one’s death
looks like it would have psychological ramifications, but, of course, financial
intermediaries are not people.124 The Treasury Department would actually
impose a profitability hit on those covered by the living will requirement by
118

Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d)(1).
Id.
120 Id.
121 Perhaps for this reason, British regulators and academics appear to be particularly enamored of them.
See, e.g., Alistair Darling, A Strong City Is Not Just in Britain’s Interests, TIMES (London), Dec. 2, 2009, at 20
(“Living wills are now the agreed tool for ensuring that banks, not taxpayers, meet the cost of any future
failures.”); Avgouleas et al., supra note 117, at 8–9; Giles et al., supra note 117.
122 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d)(1).
123 However, as Gillian Tett points out:
119

The issue at stake revolves around a matter that often bedevils personal wills—namely, the tricky
question of transparency. In order to make it easy to wind down a large bank, it is crucial to have
structures that are relatively simple and streamlined. However, in the past few decades, the
largest banks in the world have stealthily built corporate structures that are fiendishly complex,
straddling numerous borders and plagued with offshore entities. Lehman Brothers was but one
example of that. The pattern, of course, is no accident. After all, large investment banks excel in
regulatory and tax arbitrage, and all that cross-border complexity and opacity enables them to
exploit such loopholes with ease. The pattern is also one reason that the living will idea could be
very controversial, if regulators ever try to push it through.
Gillian Tett, Idea of “Living Wills” Is Likely to Die a Quiet Death, FT.COM (Aug. 13, 2009, 7:50 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/098ac1ec-882d-11de-82e4-00144feabdc0.html.
124 This is one reason why the living will idea seems attractive in theory but would raise many problems
in practice. What if the bank is wrong? Or if it makes little real effort to come up with a workable living will,
an eminently likely possibility?
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uncovering tax ploys, which will make them, if anything, less safe and sound,
at least in the near term.125 And just because an institution has outlined all of
its activities and set forth a way to wind up each one does not mean that
regulators will have the guts to actually follow the will (and pronounce the
death sentence that must precede it). For these reasons, living wills, though
interesting ideas, should be deemed ancillary aspects of regulatory reform and
resolution authority itself; the wills make that authority more easily
exercisable, but do little to identify where and when such authority should be
exercised.
None of this is meant as a comprehensive summary of Dodd-Frank’s
resolution procedures; they are quite detailed, and the focus here is on the heart
of resolution rather than the ancillary issues that accompany any
comprehensive financial reform. The Dodd-Frank Act includes many of these
accompanying provisions.126 In addition, Congress has also enacted highminded nostrums like “taxpayers shall bear no losses from the exercise of”
resolution authority.127 But it is these sorts of fundamental values that
expanded resolution authority risks traducing, as the next Part makes clear.
II. ANTI-SEIZURE PROTECTIONS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Resolution authority’s legitimacy turns on a bargain that its expansion will
largely undo. The bargain offered by the FDIC is unprecedented powers of
nationalization in exchange for the federally insured bank charter, which offers
its holders cheap capital and willing depositors.128
However, the expansion of resolution authority is by its very terms the right
to seize an institution that does not enjoy, in exchange, the benefit of the bank
charter and the low cost of capital that comes with it. Instead, the benefit
granted by the government is the right to play in the waters of American
finance at scale, including through the ownership of a bank or thrift subsidiary,
and to profit accordingly. While that right is a valuable one, it is very different
125

See Zaring, THE CONGLOMERATE, supra note 114.
For example, the Act provides the government with the power to claw back compensation from
executives during a two-year period before resolution, as well as the ability to levy a fee on large financial
institutions to cover the costs of supervising them. Dodd-Frank Act § 318(c).
127 Id. § 214(c).
128 See Ilan Moscovitz, The Coming Financial Meltdown, MOTLEY FOOL (June 15, 2010),
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2010/06/15/the-coming-financial-meltdown.aspx (noting that FDIC
insurance creates a “cheap source of funding” for banks); cf. Sam Zuckerman, Turning Bankers into
Entrepreneurs, U.S. BANKER, Jan. 1, 1997, at 46, 46–48.
126
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from the corporate form offered to banks and thrifts. Nor is that right paired
with formal deposit insurance or the worry-free capital that it attracts,129 hence
the fact that various of the proposals for resolution authority would permit the
FDIC to act to take over and shut down institutions that it does not insure or
regulate.
But exactly which institutions? Unless resolution authority’s reach is
limited to a very carefully defined set of institutions, the scope of those
affected by the exchange of a government guarantee for the extra-strong
government imposition will remain unclear, making for uncertain markets and
potentially skittish shareholders.
What is needed, and what this Article hopes to provide, is a case for the
legitimacy of the practice of resolution authority that puts any new expansion
of that authority onto a firmer base.
While it is difficult to feel sympathy for the financial institutions facing an
expanded threat of the government’s death penalty, neither is it always clear
that this kind of authority will be used for good.130 Although Washington
Mutual’s shareholders had few options after the FDIC concluded that there was
a case for seizing and closing the bank and selling its assets to J.P. Morgan
Chase, some observers think that the agency’s hasty resolution of what was
then the nation’s largest thrift severely exacerbated the financial crisis.131 If
129

See GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010).
It is not always obvious that these varieties of resolution authority are wholly threatening to the owners
of the assets seized by the government, to be sure. Insolvent institutions, after all, are pretty much by
definition not likely to be totally valuable. See, e.g., In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 917
(Reg’l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1974) (“[T]here is a certain incongruity between the high demands which the investors
make of the [Regional Rail Reorganization] Act and the unhappy position they, or in any event most of them,
occupied when it was enacted. The idea that billions of dollars of liquidation proceeds of these bankrupt
railroads are lurking just around the corner is unrealistic in the last degree.”).
131 See Felix Salmon, One Question for Sheila Bair, REUTERS BLOG (Nov. 12, 2009, 2:11 PM),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/11/12/one-question-for-sheila-bair/ (“If I could ask her just one
question, it would be about her actions taking over WaMu and wiping out all its senior unsecured debt. That’s
the wholesale interbank market right there, and in the wake of the WaMu collapse, banks pretty much stopped
lending to each other, fearful that at any point Bair could step in and wipe out billions of dollars in assets. The
ensuing credit crunch was responsible for trillions of dollars in stock and bond-market losses, and Tim
Geithner, for one, was furious at Bair for her precipitous decision.”). This resolution also probably
undermined the existence of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) (which will be eliminated under DoddFrank), as the agency depended on Washington Mutual for an extremely large proportion of its revenues
because it was the most likely agency to be folded into another one. See Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring,
Charter Switching and the Financial Crisis: Evidence from the Office of Thrift Supervision (Oct. 13, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.uiuc.edu/_shared/pdfs/thrift%20chartering%20draft%
2010%20dz.docx.
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resolution authority is to expand, there is good reason to want some limitations
on its scope.
This is not merely a policy question; the case for a successful constitutional
challenge of the expanded authority given the FDIC by Congress is a close
one. In what follows, this Article reviews how the Takings Clause, the Due
Process Clause, and the constitutional protections against arbitrary and biased
decisionmaking threaten the resolution authority passed by Congress. This
Article further suggests that an imperfectly defined category of institutions in
peril and a number of Executive Branch sign-offs with one expedited district
court check might not be able to provide the necessary constitutional basis for
resolution authority.
A. Takings
Before the Dodd-Frank Act, angry shareholders failed to convince the
courts that the seizure of banks during the recent financial crisis amounted to a
taking.132 But the case for a takings claim is much closer than it would appear.
These claims failed in part due to long practice and in part due to the
potentially vast consequences of permitting them in these sorts of contexts.
Yet seizing a bank and wiping out shareholders without compensation
resembles any understanding of a taking. It therefore must be managed
carefully if expanded resolution authority is to survive the first attempt to use
it.
In fact, under current doctrine, it is not that regulatory seizures could not
possibly amount to a taking or that resolved financial institutions in particular
could not play this role. A regulatory imposition may result in a compensable
taking in either of two ways: through a physical invasion or through a
regulatory act that largely destroys a property’s value.
First, when a regulatory scheme results in a physical invasion or permanent
occupation of property, such invasions are “compensable without case-specific
inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.”133 In
general, in the case of physical invasions, the Supreme Court pointed out that
“no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public

132 See Thykkuttathil v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 293, 296 (2009) (“A takings claim will not lie for the
seizure of a bank by federal regulators, even if an allegation is made that the seized bank had not yet failed
when it was seized.”), aff’d, No. 2010-17109, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17109 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2010).
133 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
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purpose behind it, we have required compensation.”134 Of course, a resolution
involves just this type of a physical invasion: FDIC officials ordinarily show
up and instruct the employees of the insolvent institution as to what they must
do over the weekend.135 They also tend to take the books and records of the
failed institutions.136
In cases where a regulatory scheme does not involve a physical invasion or
occupation of property, the Supreme Court “has generally ‘been unable to
develop any “set formula” for determining when “justice and fairness” require
that economic injuries caused by public action’” result in a compensable
taking.137 The Court, however, has identified three factors to consider when
determining whether a governmental action has exceeded “regulation” to
become a “taking.” Those factors are “the character of the governmental
action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investmentbacked expectations.”138
Here too the case for a taking is not, on its face, ludicrous: the character of
the government action is severe, its economic impact, from the perspectives of
the shareholders, is awesome, and their investment-backed expectations—their
shares—are, of course, wiped out. It is also worth noting that, in other
contexts, the United States has taken the international position that the
expropriation of private property must be paired with full and fair
compensation for the owners of that property.139
To be sure, banks have never had much luck arguing that seizures of their
assets via the FDIC’s resolution authority implicate the Takings Clause. The
Federal Circuit has held that “[g]iven the highly regulated nature of the
134 Id.; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (“[A]
permanent physical occupation authorized by [the] government is a taking without regard to the public
interests that it may serve.”).
135 See Mary Gordon, Bank Failure Friday Is Back as Feds Shut Down Four More Banks Last Week, BUS.
INSIDER (Feb. 22, 2010, 9:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/bank-failure-friday-is-back-as-feds-shutdown-four-more-banks-last-week-2010-2 (noting that the FDIC tends to fail banks on Fridays).
136 Financial Markets in Crisis: Overview of FDIC’s Authority with Respect to Bank Failures, GIBSON
DUNN
(Sept.
30,
2008),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/FinancialMarketsCrisisFDICAuthority-BankFailures.aspx (“The FDIC’s first step as conservator or receiver is to take possession of
all of the closed institution’s books and records and assets and loans.”).
137 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)); accord Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264,
295 (1981) (applying the “economically viable use” test in determining the existence of a regulatory taking).
138 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
139 See generally Curtis, supra note 64 (discussing the compensation required by the Takings Clause
during government takeovers of banks).
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banking industry,. . .the [federal regulators’ seizure of the bank] could not
possibly have interfered with a reasonable investment-backed expectation on
the part of [the owners of a bank].”140 It has further observed that “[i]t is well
known that ‘[b]anking is one of the longest regulated and most closely
supervised of public callings.’”141 Accordingly, “[t]he Federal Circuit has
never upheld a claim that a seizure of a financial institution under the statutes
and regulations designed to insure safe and secure banking institutions
constituted a taking.”142
Moreover, these recent results are consistent with long established Supreme
Court precedent. Decades ago, in Fahey v. Mallone,143 the Court observed
that:
Banking is one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised
of public callings. It is one in which accumulated experience of
supervisors, acting for many states under various statutes, has
established well-defined practices for the appointment of
conservators, receivers and liquidators. . ..A discretion to make
regulations to guide supervisory action in such matters may be
constitutionally permissible while it might not be allowable to
144
authorize creation of new crimes in uncharted fields.

140

Golden Pac. Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Cal. Hous. Sec., Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting Fahey v. Mallone,
332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947)); see also Castle v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 187, 220 (2000) (“The law is clear that
the seizure of a bank that fails to meet regulatory capital requirements does not constitute a taking.”), aff’d in
relevant part, 301 F.3d 1328, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1575 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (“Banking is a highly regulated industry, and an individual engaged in that industry is deemed to
understand if his bank becomes insolvent or is operated in violation of law or regulations, the federal
government may ‘take possession of its premises and holdings’ and no compensation for that governmental
action will be due.” (quoting Cal. Hous. Sec., 959 F.2d at 958)); Am. Cont’l Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct.
692, 698 (1991) (“[I]t was hardly contrary to reasonable expectations of an investor in the highly regulated,
federally insured banking industry when the federal government buttressed the then-existing regulatory
scheme by authorizing appointment of a conservator or receiver when a federally insured bank is in
[trouble].”). A bank seizure must be presumed to be lawful when considering a takings claim based on that
federal action. See Acadia Tech., Inc. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“For takings
purposes, we therefore must assume the government conduct at issue . . . was not unlawful.”).
142 Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 533, 535 (2000), aff’d, 97 F. App’x. 331 (Fed. Cir.
2004). Similar rules appear to apply in other jurisdictions, which are also unlikely to compensate failed bank
shareholders. Northern Rock shareholders lost on their claim that the statutory scheme establishing how much
the British government has to compensate shareholders violated Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European
Convention of Human Rights. See SRM Global Master Fund v. Comm’rs of Her Majesty’s Treasury, [2009]
EWCA (Civ) 788, [2009] W.L.R. [267] (Eng.). There was much more debate about this question, however, in
Europe.
143 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
144 Id. at 250.
141
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And the problem is not merely one of doctrine, but of a culture lacking
sympathy for the owners of federally insured banks. Foreign shareholders
frequently have more protection than American shareholders in the case of a
takeover by banking regulators, for instance as in Europe, which is exceedingly
worried about the prospect of unwarranted resolution of still-valuable financial
enterprises.145 But those European financial intermediaries generally do not
have formal depositor protections in place—the benefit of the bargain for
which resolution authority is a cost.
B. Due Process
The point of resolution authority is both to give the regulators the power to
act quickly and to encourage them, almost to the point of requiring them, to
use it. A problem then arises regarding predeprivation notice and the
opportunity to a fair hearing, rights usually guaranteed under due process.146
This then requires a look at the oft-invoked three-factor test in Mathews v.
Eldridge:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
147
requirement would entail.

145 Nor is this only a matter for the United States. One private equity fund has sued the German
government over its seizure of a bank in which the equity fund was heavily invested. Germany Defends Hypo
Real Squeeze-Out After Lawsuit, REUTERS, Oct. 12, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSLC18214220091012. The central problem has been described as follows: “Governments forced to
step in to save the financial system would prefer to close or merge weak banks to revive lending as quickly as
possible. But shareholders . . . angling to make lemonade out of lemons, want to eke out the best return they
can, even if it delays an economic recovery.” Carter Dougherty, Holding His Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2009, at B4. J.C. Flowers bought about 25% of Hypo Real Estate in 2008 (approximately $1.8 billion), but
that has now been reduced to a less than 3% stake. See JC Flowers Seeks to Block Soffin Forcing Hypo
Minority Sales, IRISH INDEP. (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.independent.ie/business/european/jc-flowers-seeksto-block-soffin-forcing-hypo-minority-sales-1911446.html. The reduction in stake is presumably due to
dilution. The uncertainty, of course, can be telling. It is difficult to plan for the future in a financial institution
that can go from well-earned to resolved in a matter of days. Bear Stearns, after all, was deemed solvent by its
regulator up to the moment of its resolution by contract orchestrated by the Treasury Department. Davidoff &
Zaring, supra note 11, at 476 (discussing the SEC’s assessment that Bear Stearns was adequately capitalized
up until the moment of collapse).
146 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
147 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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The Mathews regime clearly applies to financial regulation.148 But this
does not mean that lengthy predeprivation notice and an opportunity to be
heard is always required when federal agencies seize failing banks. In FDIC v.
Mallen, the Supreme Court identified three factors that typically are present in
cases in which a postdeprivation hearing is sufficient to satisfy due process: (1)
the action is necessary to further an important governmental interest; (2) there
is a need for prompt action; and (3) there is a substantial assurance that the
deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted.149 The Court concluded that the
FDIC’s seizure powers passed this test, as applied to banks and thrifts.150
Is due process implicated by a broad new resolution authority regime,
extending beyond insured banks? The Mathews test obviously involves strong
private and strong governmental interests, so it appears that the critical issues
are the procedures offered by resolution and its alternatives. It is here that the
expansion of resolution authority risks denying the seized institution an
opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”151
As the risks of a wrongful seizure are dramatic, additional procedures, such as
an auction in addition to the carefully articulated ex ante list, would ensure that
financial institutions have an adequate opportunity to be heard.
Moreover, the seizure of a bank will, in many cases, involve the dismissal
of the board and principals (and Congress has, as it has enhanced resolution
authority, urged the FDIC to exercise this power), which presents its own due
process concerns. The Supreme Court has established that the discharge of an
employee by a governmental entity interferes with the employee’s liberty
interest under the procedural Due Process Clause if combined with “any charge
against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his
community,” although the discharge must be severely stigmatizing to implicate
constitutional rights.152 But, in an era of intense banker hatred, it is not
impossible to imagine the seizure of a bank and the firing of its employees
resulting in this sort of stigmatization.153

148

FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242 (1988).
Id. at 240–41; see also Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. DLG Fin. Corp., 29 F.3d 993, 1001–
02 (5th Cir. 1994) (using the Mallen factors to evaluate the sufficiency of due process in an FDIC takeover).
150 Mallen, 486 U.S. at 240.
151 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
152 Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
153 See, e.g., Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine, ROLLING STONE, July 9, 2009, at 52
(“The world’s most powerful investment bank is a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity,
relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money.”).
149
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Moreover, there are property interests at stake in these kinds of
terminations. The Court has held that “the right to continue to serve as
president of the bank and to participate in the conduct of its affairs is a
property right protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. . ..It is
also undisputed that the FDIC’s order of suspension affected a deprivation of
this property interest.”154
Also, while certain limited rights of judicial review are generally available
in resolution authority statutes, and “the existence of post-termination
procedures is relevant to the necessary scope of pre-termination
procedures,”155 the scope of procedures offered to banks and thrifts postseizure is limited, and they have rarely resulted in successful claims, making
the adequacy of the process offered now questionable.156
One may sense this not only by reviewing the FDIC’s strong won–lost
record in nationalization claims, but also by looking at how the courts have
reviewed the claims of those dispossessed by bailouts and their attendant
processes. While courts have not said that banking regulator decisions are
unreviewable as a matter of law, they have avoided in-depth scrutiny of both
monetary policy decisions and bailouts. In Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank,
Augustus Hand refrained from assessing whether a legally constituted bank
may make loans to other banks and set interest rates for those loans in forming
a basis for bailouts with Federal Reserve money during the financial crisis of
1929.157 And as for bailouts, after the Franklin National Bank failed and was
bailed out by the Federal Reserve, the Second Circuit concluded that:
Absent clear evidence of grossly arbitrary or capricious action on the
part of [the Federal Reserve or the Treasury Department,]. . .it is not
for the courts to say whether or not the actions taken were justified in
the public interest, particularly where it vitally concerned the
158
operation and stability of the nation’s banking system.

In sum, because it is very difficult to get judicial review ex post over the
decision whether to resolve or bail out—as the recent financial crisis, with few
judicial proceedings, has illustrated—it is not unreasonable to ask whether the
postdeprivation rules in place are an adequate substitute for more

154
155
156
157
158

Mallen, 486 U.S. at 240.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 n.12 (1985).
See David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 94 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
34 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1929).
Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin Nat’l Bank, 559 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1977).
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predeprivation process. Indeed, the current rules and their amendments leave
no room for such process at all.
Worrying about the due process implications of expanded seizure powers is
hardly crazy.159 The Fifth Circuit has applied the Mathews test to the issuance
of a capital directive by the FDIC.160 Further, the FDIC itself has conceded
that it is subject to constitutional review in administering its PCA powers.161
And although the FDIC’s procedures have generally withstood constitutional
scrutiny in the past—FDIC v. Mallen upheld a removal procedure that affords
an indicted bank official a post-termination hearing but neither a full
evidentiary hearing nor a right to judicial review162—that process occurred in
the context of the regulated banks and thrifts. The seizure of real property
pursuant to drug arrests, for example, has been held by the Court to be
inconsistent with due process.163 One wonders if the seizure of noninsured
banking assets would present a similar problem.
C. Bias
Lastly, the prospect of the federal banking agencies serving as the
prosecutor, judge, and executioner of these banks raises at least the specter of
biased decisionmaking. Due process also affords some constitutional
protections in relief of biased decisionmaking,164 and although the combination
of investigator and decisionmaker in a single agency alone is not enough to

159 Other lawyers have expressed their concerns about the due process implications of resolution authority
as it currently exists. See, e.g., Howard N. Cayne & Michael Caglioti, FDICIA’s New D&O Dismissal
Authority: What Process is Due?, 14 BANKING POL’Y REP. 1 (1995) (expressing doubt regarding the propriety
of the method by which the PCA processes the removal rights of the directors of seized banks and its
compliance with due process related notions of notice and opportunity to be heard).
160 FDIC v. Bank of Coushatta, 930 F.2d 1122, 1130–31 (5th Cir. 1991).
161 Id. at 1130 (“[T]he FDIC concedes that unreviewability does not extend to the issue of whether there is
a ‘constitutional right to a full hearing on the record prior to issuance of a directive,’ and instead asserts that
the procedures provide due process.”).
162 Mallen, 486 U.S. at 248 (1988).
163 See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53–54 (1993) (employing the
Mathews test in determining that the seizure of real property without notice and hearing did not, under the
circumstances of the case, comport with due process).
164 Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995) (“It is well-settled that the Due Process Clause
prevents the state from depriving a plaintiff of a protected property interest without ‘a fair trial in a fair
tribunal.’” (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))).
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offend due process,165 the question, when exemplified by the draconian act of
resolution authority, is at least worth a bit of thought.166
Biased decisionmaking usually requires a showing of particular
prejudgment, rather than the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative
functions within a single agency in general, which has been permitted ever
since the Supreme Court decided Withrow v. Larkin.167 But putting the judge
and the jury together and allowing both to make decisions in a procedure-free
environment raises the possibility of prejudgment and other problems that,
surely, regulators would prefer to avoid.
Bias claims have been leveled before against the FDIC for seizing financial
institutions; one banking lawyer believes that the entire PCA process, as it
eschews so many other procedures, is shot through with an unacceptable risk
of bias and has pursued litigation to that end.168 The possibility of a bias claim,
let alone a larger notice-before-deprivation claim, makes even more sense
given the problems associated with the expansion of resolution authority
beyond the confines of the federally insured bank charter.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL, AND EXERCISABLE, RESOLUTION AUTHORITY
If an expanded construct of resolution authority could make takings, due
process, and bias claims viable, the question is how to structure a new regime
to deal with these problems—as well as the problem of “too big to fail”—while
incentivizing the government to act when necessary, which it frequently fails
to do.
Dealing with the first problem requires both a commonsense solution and a
creative one. The commonsense rule is to make clear, ex ante, the financial
institutions subject to resolution authority. Publishing a list of these
institutions, rather than providing guidelines to identify institutions that may be
subject to nationalization in the future, is better because the ex ante approach
provides more certainty. This Part of the Article celebrates the Dodd-Frank
Act for providing a list and a dispute resolution process, rather than, for
165 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52 (1975) (rejecting a due process challenge to the combination of the
roles of investigator and decisionmaker in a state medical examiners’ board).
166 See generally Thomas M.L. Metzger, FDIC Capital Directive Procedures: The Unacceptable Risk of
Bias, 110 BANKING L.J. 237 (1993) (examining procedural due process concerns in the context of FDIC
decisionmaking).
167 421 U.S. at 52.
168 For a description of his approach, see Metzger, supra note 166.
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instance, the alternative originally proposed by the Treasury Department. The
Treasury Department’s proposal would have created a class of potentially
nationalizable institutions, and it would have been difficult to tell precisely
who belonged to the class and who did not. The owners of banks should have
a short window after seizure during which to buy back their institutions from
the government. In this way, overreaction by regulators can be countered
sensibly after a seizure without relying on the so-far toothless mechanism of
judicial review. And in this way the problem of regulatory overload can be
mitigated to address due process—and also plain regulatory capacity—
concerns.
Incentivizing more action by regulators, however, instead of deterring bad
decisions, is not easy, although a better form of regulation may lie in
international relationships instead of domestic ones. I have often touted, along
with others, the technocratic potential of international networks of regulators;
particularly in financial regulation, those networks are extremely welldeveloped.169 They offer peer support for and review of the decision to
resolve, as well as distance from the hurly-burly of domestic lobbying. This
Part outlines and justifies a way to handle resolution that might better serve
both the government and the public.
A. Protection Against Government Overreach
No matter how limited the resolution authority, in certain cases, there is
little hope that the government will be able to act in any way other than
precipitously. Emergencies arise, after all, and the recent financial crisis was
full of momentous decisions rendered overnight, or “before the Asian markets
open[ed].”170 Moreover, the exact nature of the institution subject to such
precipitous action could be unclear if resolution authority is delegated poorly.
Is there some way to use procedure to counteract the possibility of arbitrariness
in these cases?
Most likely, there is. As an initial matter, more sensible procedural
protections for seizable banks would further the important project of
incentivizing a resolution system to make good decisions. Moreover, these
protections would also address the constitutional concerns presented by the
abandonment of the bargain of resolution authority for deposit insurance,
169

See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 36−64 (2004).
Charles Babington & Alan Fram, Deal Reached on Financial Market Bailout, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 28,
2008, http://www.nysun.com/national/deal-reached-on-financial-markets-bailout/86725/.
170
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which would follow any extension of resolution authority to larger financial, or
other systemically significant, conglomerates. The protections would identify
and give notice to the “regulated industry” for Takings Clause purposes,
provide the additional procedures necessary to solve Mathews test problems,
and mitigate the concerns of biased decisionmaking by offering a market check
on the decisionmaker.
Specifically, this Article agrees, with some caveats, that the list of nonFDIC insured institutions that could be subject to resolution authority, as
provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, is a good idea. It is important, however, that
the list be published in advance and revised as the government concludes that
some institutions belong on the list, or that some have shrunk or otherwise
limited themselves sufficiently to be removed. It is also slightly alarming that
the Act includes a class of financial companies that become subject to
resolution authority without any listmaking by the regulators⎯namely, those
firms deemed bank holding companies with $50 billion of assets do not get the
benefit of an individualized assessment of whether they belong on the list,
along with the notice and comment and the assorted benefits accompanying
this sort of ventilation.171
A list alone, however, is improvable. This Article suggests that resolution
authority would be even more legitimate if it provided the institution’s owners
an opportunity to purchase back the institution shortly after its nationalization.
This opportunity may not be realistic in every case, but in at least some
imaginable cases, it may cause the government to pause before committing its
own funds to clean up an institution rather than offer that institution back to its
owners. It also formalizes, after resolution, the informal process the
government undergoes before resolution, where so-called “problem banks” are
shopped by the FDIC to potential buyers, without a clear role for the input of
the institution’s management. This ad hoc process is not terrible, but would be
even better if it was clearly part of the resolution process as a requirement
imposed on the government before nationalization. Furthermore, the prospect
of a required auction, though rare in the annals of administrative law, is hardly

171 The Dodd-Frank Act allows a financial institution to contest the decision to be labeled systemically
significant before the agency. The right to judicial review of that decision is somewhat less clear, however.
Judicial review of decisions to exercise resolution authority are to be made through closed proceedings,
however, so the publicity permitted by the statute is not entirely clear. See Dodd-Frank Act § 202.
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outside the realm of conjecture⎯Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried proposed
just such an auction process for valuing secured claims in bankruptcy.172
The following subsections consider the advantages and disadvantages of
such an approach and conclude that it offers more predictability, certainty, and
flexibility than would the broader, Executive-Branch-and-financial
conglomerates-only alternative that Congress passed.
1. Making a List
There is much to recommend in providing a list of companies that are
bigger than banks and thrifts that would be covered by the expanded power of
resolution authority. This subsection of the Article presents a theoretical
justification for Dodd-Frank’s list requirement, along with an expression of
modest concern over its class of covered entities: bank holding companies with
over $50 billion in assets. A revisable list is more flexible and more certain
than is resolution authority limited to financial companies, if that term were
defined only by the statute, rather than also by a designation of the Financial
Oversight Council.173 While a “financial company” is a definition, its
coverage is not always clear. For example, consider controlling investors in
financial intermediaries and holders of single thrift charters, which include
some very idiosyncratic companies, such as a department store and a maker of
funeral caskets. There is little doubt that future mergers will create large
conglomerates, with some arms having activities “financial in nature,” such as
providing consumers with credit to purchase the conglomerate’s other
products.174 If other non-holding (or possibly even financial) institutions
belong in that list—as suggested by the bailouts of the hedge fund Long-Term
Capital Management in 1999175 and the auto companies in 2008—they should
be identified specifically.
In addition, many observers have suggested that the ability to predict
whether a particular institution can be resolved is important both because it
limits the government’s choices to a defined set of institutions, and it allows
investors to price the possibility of a government takeover. For example, it is
172 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2386, 2409−23 (2001) (outlining the auction method).
173 For a discussion of other proposals regarding resolution authority, such as the proposal to extend the
power to cover financial holding companies, see supra Part II.
174 Donelson & Zaring, supra note 131.
175 See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT (2002) (recounting the fall of Long-Term Capital Management).
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suggested that if we know who is subject to a government guarantee we will be
able to order our affairs accordingly and with more certainty.176 It is, to be
sure, difficult to predict whether the ability to be seized will be seen as an
advantage by the market (because of an implicit government guarantee for
some creditors, such as the depositors in banks covered by the FDIC), or a
disadvantage (because of the threat of seizure). But one chief advantage of
resolution authority—that creditors as well as shareholders can suffer losses—
suggests that the certainty of resolvableness may increase the cost of capital for
the institutions on the list, and many observers worried about the problem of
too big to fail institutions welcoming higher capital costs for large
conglomerates not yet covered by FDIC insurance.177
Finally, another advantage to obligating the government to name the
institutions that it might nationalize is that it might encourage the government
to limit the number of institutions that are in fact too big to fail through other
means. The exercise of naming the new and big institutions that might be
subject to expanded resolution powers may help to solve a problem that Art
Wilmarth has identified as particularly salient and problematic for banks. He
has observed that institutions clearly deemed to be too big to fail might also be
“too big to discipline adequately” because the government is unable to threaten
the institutions with serious sanctions.178 Since defining the threatened
institution is a precondition for outlining a credible threat of discipline,
publishing a list of businesses subject to resolution authority and revising that
list as necessary, may provide some initial steps toward solving the “too big to
discipline adequately” problem. By forcing the government to commit to
certain institutions that might be on it, such a list can perhaps incentivize the
government to consider ways to shrink it.179 But creating a category of
institutions that automatically join this list problematizes this otherwise useful
approach.

176

See GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS (2004).
Moreover, the owners and shareholders of institutions that the government identifies as subject to
potential taking might strive to get off of that list, possibly by shrinking in size and, accordingly, in systemic
importance.
178 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000:
Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 304.
179 Id.
177
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2. The Market Out
A list especially helps to solve the Mathews predeprivation process
problems, and the Dodd-Frank legislation is commendable to the extent that it
adopts the list requirement. But the gold standard for constitutional
administrative procedure is postdeprivation process (such as judicial review),
and simply making a list does not offer postdeprivation process. One way to
address this concern is to offer to the owners and managers of systemically
significant financial institutions an opportunity to buy their way out of
resolution conservatorships. When banks look like they may be insolvent, the
government frequently, but quietly, cajoles them to consider a sale that can get
them out of trouble. But these informal efforts are not required of the
government; the last clear chance for owners to do something about a financial
institution that they feel is valuable, but wrongly used by regulators, comes
after the seizure itself. However, there is no procedure in place to make use of
the last clear chance.180 When a seizure occurs, the posturing of the slowmotion failure is over and a formal resolution process has begun. At this point,
the remedies to owners are restricted to judicial review of the terms they
receive from the FDIC, and in a limited way at that. This Article has already
discussed the difficulties faced by owners pursuing post-resolution litigation
against the FDIC. Owners would benefit from a final formalized opportunity
to take back control of the institution from the government: a right of first
refusal.
Administrative scholars and Congress rarely urge these sorts of market
solutions.181 But markets are nowhere deeper than they are for American
financial intermediaries, the most likely targets of any reformed resolution
procedure. In the instance that the regulators erred and seized the institution
unwisely, then its owners will likely be able to raise the money to buy back the
institution.182
In this way, a market out for resolved financial institutions would serve as a
useful safeguard against the government’s reaching too quickly to nationalize
viable institutions. Further, a buy-back window would, if exercised, likely
180 The last clear chance doctrine in tort is designed to deal with these sorts of games of chicken. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 479, 480 (1974).
181 For an example where Congress did, in fact, urge such a solution, see Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum
Equity, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 218–20 (2005) (discussing the FCC’s slow willingness to turn to
an auction model for its spectrum space after Congress ordered it to conduct auctions).
182 Moreover, a guaranteed ex post buy-back opportunity may help both parties avoid posturing about the
possibility of a seizure before the fact.
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influence government regulators loath to spend dollars from the fisc to make
up differences between the obligations of systemically significant institutions
and those of their many counterparties.183 The buy-back window thus
concentrates the minds of both the regulators and the regulated after the critical
decision has been made, but before all of those obligations are unwound. Use
of the buy-back will be rare, and is thus no panacea, but there is no better way
to check an economically significant decision by the government than to see if
a market-driven alternative exists. Only a formal ex post auction can do this.
Nor is the possibility of an auction implausible. Bebchuk and Fried have
already recognized the potential power of auctions in valuing secured claims in
bankruptcy, when, occasionally, secured creditors find that looking to their
security does not satisfy their claims against the debtor.184 Although the details
of Bebchuk and Fried’s scheme are complicated, the point for the purposes of
this Article is that they have devised a plausible approach to auctions initiated
following government action. If it can work in the context of bankruptcy, it
can work in resolution as well.
Nor should the general prohibition against equity owners retaining a stake
in a company reorganized following Chapter 11 bankruptcies without
contributing additional value (the “absolute priority rule” and “new value
corollary,” respectively) present an insuperable legal problem.185 As a matter
of law, these bankruptcy rules need not constrain resolutions, which have been
carved out of the Bankruptcy Code.186 And as a matter of policy, this marketout offer would turn on the contribution of new value by the owners and
managers of the resolved institution⎯it is that new value that would form the
basis of the price paid to the government. Regulators particularly worried
about the possibility of self-dealing by the owners during this market check
could, of course, broaden the formal auction to include outsiders as well as
insiders.187
183 Although economists like the idea of valuing government assets by auctioning them on occasion, the
government looks to these sorts of auctions rarely.
184 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 172.
185 For a discussion of these rules, see Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship,
526 U.S. 434, 444–50 (1999).
186 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
187 Indeed, the Supreme Court in 203 North LaSalle suggested that a broader opportunity to participate
could cure problems with the participation of equity holders in reorganized companies taken through Chapter
11. See 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 458 (“[S]ome form of market valuation may be available to test the
adequacy of an old equity holder’s proposed contribution.”); see also Hieu T. Hoang, Comment, The New
Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule After In re 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership: What Should
Bankruptcy Courts Do, and How Can Congress Help?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (2000).
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B. Prevention from Underreach
New resolution authority does not merely raise concerns about the prospect
of executive excess. Executive modesty is an equally serious problem. Any
administrative scheme that relies on the exercise of regulatory discretion at the
right moment expects a lot out of its publicly employed factotums.188
Regulators, no less than businesspeople, are prone to making mistakes; it
would be naïve to pretend that, even at its technocratic best, the government
always gets it right.189 Many scholars, ranging from the Nobel-Prize-winning
public choice economist James Buchanan,190 to other observers such as
Clifford Winston, have argued that the government’s economic regulation is
subject to many systematic pressures that can impinge upon its ability to make
wise decisions—or any decisions at all.191
This is the problem of underreach, and this section focuses on that
possibility. Having resolution authority, the government still may not exercise
that authority to the degree that it should. In fact, past financial crises are
replete with examples suggesting that regulators consistently forbear in the
worst cases—relaxing the safety and soundness standards for failing, or
downright insolvent, institutions in lieu of resolving them.192 Forbearance
occurred during the S&L crisis of the 1980s.193 There was probably
forbearance for likely insolvent institutions like Citibank and Bank of America
during the recent crisis.194 And cynics have noted that Citibank alone arguably
188 Ron Feldman, Interview with Raghuram Rajan, REGION, Dec. 2009, at 19, 23 (“There is always some
amount of regulatory capture. The people the regulators interact with are people they get to know. They see
the world from their perspective, and, you know, they want to make sure they’re in their good books.”).
189 David Zaring, The Post-Crisis and Its Critics, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter
Zaring, The Post-Crisis] (discussing some of the often overblown, but hardly baseless fears about government
intervention in the economy that have shaped many evaluations of the post-crisis).
190 Thomas Romer, Nobel Laureate: On James Buchanan’s Contributions to Public Economics, 1988 J.
ECON. PERSP. 165.
191 See CLIFFORD WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE: MICROECONOMIC POLICY
RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE (2006).
192 See Charles W. Calomiris et al., Financial Crisis Policies and Resolution Mechanisms: A Taxonomy
from Cross-Country Experience, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: CONTAINMENT AND RESOLUTION 25–75
(Patrick Honohan & Luc Laeven eds., 2005). For an analysis of the competing concerns behind secrecy in
bank regulation, see Heidi Schooner, The Secrets of Bank Regulation: A Reply to Professor Cohen, 6 GREEN
BAG 2D 389, 392 (2003) (“Bank regulators generally insist on sound accounting practices. However, . . . it is
not always clear that bank regulators should so insist when disclosure of a loss might threaten the solvency of a
bank, or worse, the financial system.”).
193 See CALAVITA ET AL., supra note 57, at 9–15; Calomiris et al., supra note 192, at 32, 73.
194 See Yves Smith, Citi and Bank of America “Encouraged” to Get More Capital as Result of Stress
Tests, NAKED CAPITALISM (Apr. 27, 2009, 11:19 PM), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/04/citi-andbank-of-america-e.html.
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has been insolvent—and enjoyed forbearance—three times in the past forty
years, once due to sovereign debt exposure, once due to emerging markets
exposure, and most recently, again, due to housing market exposure.195 As
Citibank costs the government more and more money, Americans might be
forgiven for wishing that the bank had been nationalized and sold off or broken
up much earlier.
A government that is given the strong tool of resolution authority must be
encouraged to use it. But how can it be so encouraged? The answer offered
here lies in the internationalization of the exercise of resolution authority. The
underlying theory is that a government with broad resolution authority can be
encouraged to actually utilize its tools by making its decision in an
international context, subject to a beneficial sort of peer pressure and removed,
to a degree, from the problems of agency interference. One international
institution has already indicated its concern about cross-border resolutions of
financial intermediaries.196 That institution is the Basel Committee, which is
an imperfect but available, active, and fully formed resource on which
governments have relied since 1974 to deal with difficult problems of bank
supervision.197 The Committee, and other international regulatory networks
like it, are increasingly essential to any coherent regulation of the ever more
global financial system. Because resolution authority is one of the most
important aspects of any regulatory regime, it makes sense to think about it in a
global context. What follows will expand on the advantages of an international
solution to the problem of resolution authority by considering the international
nature of the problem, the capacity of the international system, the way such an
approach would work, and the alternatives to it.

195 See Citigroup VIEs Raise Question of Solvency, MISH’S GLOBAL ECONOMIC TREND ANALYSIS (Feb.
26, 2008, 4:52 AM), http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2008/02/citigroup-vies-raise-questionof.html. For a podcast on this issue criticizing Citi’s three bailouts, see Chicago Booth Podcast: The Future of
Markets, U. CHI. BOOTH SCH. BUS. (June 29, 2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.chicagobooth.edu/multimedia/
podcast/?play=http://chicagobooth.edu/multimedia/audio/2009-05-29-ManConKeynote.mp3#02:07:32
(featuring six Chicago Booth faculty members including Gary Becker, Kevin Murphy, Anil Kashyup, and
Steve Kaplan, as well as moderator Ray Suarez, a veteran journalist, reexamining the role of government in the
economy at a special forum at the 57th annual Management Conference in Chicago).
196 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSSBORDER BANK RESOLUTION GROUP 15 (Mar. 2010) [hereinafter BASEL COMMITTEE].
197 Zaring, The Post-Crisis, supra note 189.
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1. International Nature of the Problem
Cross-border strategies to resolution authority are a necessary part of any
serious resolution of a big financial firm. Indeed, such institutions could not
possibly be more international. All of the large financial holding companies
ply their trades in, and spread their risks across, various foreign
environments.198 The catastrophic failures of Lehman Brothers, and the
Franklin National Bank and Bank Herstatt before it, are examples of the crossborder difficulties presented by insolvency.199 A quick and orderly dissolution
and resolution of a multinational bank in the United States is of little worth if
the institution collapses in London and Tokyo, and the creditors race to those
courthouses and pick over the bank’s assets while American regulators attempt
to figure out exactly what the bank does and does not own.200 Indeed, Lehman
Brothers was shipping capital to London in vast quantities in its last days in a
desperate effort to survive the financial crisis.201 Another example is AIG,
which sold most of its credit default protection—the business that laid it low—
through London.202
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, American regulators have threatened to
include certain large foreign institutions in their definition of financial
companies that would be subject to resolution, and in fact, the Dodd-Frank Act
provides for their regulation.203 But these regulators also have recognized that

198 See, e.g., id. (suggesting coordinated resolution of financial institutions in light of their increasingly
global nature).
199 See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
200 See BASEL COMMITTEE, supra note 196, at 15 (“In the event of the failure of a cross-border financial
institution, once the relevant component entities enter into insolvency proceedings, the insolvency regimes
applicable to the major entities are likely to be separate proceedings . . . .”); see also id. at 18 (“The concepts
of universality and territoriality strictly only describe the way in which national authorities will apply their
insolvency and related resolution processes to individual institutions (a financial institution with branches and
assets located in other jurisdictions). These concepts are not determinative in the situation of financial groups
consisting of multiple legal entities. Accordingly whether a jurisdiction follows the universal approach or
territorial approach in relation to branches does not govern the resolution of subsidiaries of foreign institutions.
In both cases, the subsidiary is subject to separate, local insolvency proceedings.”).
201 Left in Limbo—or Worse—by Lehman, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Oct. 1, 2008, 12:08 PM),
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/left-in-limbo-or-worse-by-lehman/ (“The fallout appears to be
rooted in Lehman’s London unit, where the firm handled billions of dollars in transaction from hedge fund
clients from all over the world. Many funds chose to clear trades through London because of regulatory rules
that allowed firms to borrow more money than they could from brokers in New York.”).
202 See Mary Williams Walsh, Risky Trading Wasn’t Just on the Fringe at A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2010, at B1; see also Langley et al., supra note 12.
203 See infra notes 205–10 and accompanying text.
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unilateral efforts to take over a big European or Japanese bank with a
substantial American presence is likely to be exceedingly difficult.204
The result in the past has often been a race to the courthouse when financial
intermediaries fail. The American approach to cross-border insolvencies
exemplifies the problem, though the courts and Congress have tried to improve
their global footprint. The question of how a United States court should act in
the context of a cross-border insolvency has been the subject of a historical
debate between two competing theories: territorialism and universalism.205
Under the territorial approach, American courts and regulators have failed
institutions without foreign consultation; the universal approach contemplates
a more coordinated process.
An example of the difference between territorialism and universalism is
found in bankruptcy: under its territorial approach, “the court in each
jurisdiction where the debtor has assets distributes the assets located in that
jurisdiction pursuant to local rules.”206 This approach “is often referred to
derogatorily as ‘the grab rule’ because each court takes control of the estate of
a debtor and tends to distribute them in a way that favors local creditors.”207
By contrast, the universal approach contemplates “a primary insolvency
proceeding. . .in the debtor’s domiciliary country” with courts in other
jurisdictions where the debtor has assets “defer[ring] to the foreign proceeding.
. .to facilitate the centralized liquidation of the debtor’s estate according to the
rules of the debtor’s home country.”208 The United States has moved toward
the universal approach, but the problem becomes finding the right country in
which to centralize resolution or liquidation. In bankruptcy, the American
approach contemplates a number of factors in deciding whether an American
court should coordinate its efforts to deal with a bankrupt firm that has a
presence in other countries—and that has filed for bankruptcy in those

204

See infra notes 205–09 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Nigel John Howcroft, Universal vs. Territorial Models for Cross-Border Insolvency: The
Theory, the Practice, and the Reality That Universalism Prevails, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 366, 368 (2008)
(“[T]wo trends have emerged: the ‘universal’ approach and the ‘territorial’ approach.”).
206 In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 2001).
207 Howcroft, supra note 205, at 371.
208 Treco, 240 F.3d at 153; see also Howcroft, supra note 205, at 370 (“In its pure form, a universal
approach dictates that other jurisdictions recognize the orders of the court overseeing the main jurisdictional
proceedings. This means that each time a jurisdiction embracing universalism is (a) implicated in a case and
(b) is not the main jurisdiction, that jurisdiction must recognize the world-wide reach of the proceeding on foot
in the main jurisdiction.”).
205
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countries as well.209 These factors include comity, but particularly focus on
the principle place of business of the insolvent institution. The suggestion of
this Article is only that regulators forcing resolutions ought to move in the
same direction that courts are already headed in matters of bankruptcy.
Congress also has insisted that the government, in resolving an institution,
“shall coordinate, to the maximum extent possible, with the appropriate foreign
financial authority regarding the orderly liquidation of any covered financial
company that has assets or operations in a country other than the United
States.”210

209 Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code (now superseded by Chapter 15 of the Code), “enacted as part of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, ‘was intended to deal with the complex and increasingly important
problems involving the legal effect the United States courts will give to foreign bankruptcy proceedings.’”
Treco, 240 F.3d at 153 (quoting Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 454 (2d Cir.
1985)). As the Treco court noted, § 304’s enactment was “a step toward the universality approach.” Id. at
154; see also Andrew B. Dawson, Offshore Bankruptcies, 88 NEB. L. REV. 317, 325 (2009) (“Since its
enactment in 1978, the United States Bankruptcy Code has endorsed a universalist-type treatment of crossborder insolvencies by encouraging cooperation with foreign bankruptcy courts.”). It allowed “a foreign
representative [to] commence an ancillary proceeding to assist the foreign proceeding” and “provid[ed] that a
foreign representative may request injunctive relief, turnover, or ‘other appropriate relief’ in connection with a
foreign proceeding.” Francisco Vazquez, Cross-Border Bankruptcy Developments: The Movement Towards
Universality in the United States, 2005 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 633, 636. However, § 304 did “not require an
extension of comity to all foreign proceedings or foreign countries” and was therefore characterized as
adopting a “‘modified’ form of universality.” Id. Indeed, before relief would be deemed appropriate under
§ 304, a foreign representative would have to establish that relief would:

assure an economical and expeditions [sic] administration of such estate, consistent with—
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience in
the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent disposition of property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the order
prescribed by [the Bankruptcy Code];
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the individual that such
foreign proceeding concerns.
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2000)).
Although comity was a consideration under § 304, its hodgepodge of factors—along with the subjective nature
of the term “comity” itself—stymied predictability. See Kevin J. Beckering, United States Cross-Border
Corporate Insolvency: The Impact of Chapter 15 on Comity and the New Legal Environment, 14 L. & BUS.
REV. AM. 281, 296 (2008) (“[S]ection 304(c) cannot yield certain, or even predictable, results.”). After all,
“[o]ne judge’s balance of the interests of different States to achieve his/her understanding of justice will differ
from the balance of another judge, and such variance is amplified by broad authority and flexibility.” Id.
210 Dodd-Frank Act § 201(a)(N).
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2. Capacity of the International System
Prompted by three large international bank failures in 1974,211 the Central
Bank Governors of the Group of Ten Countries (G-10), Luxembourg, and
Switzerland agreed to establish the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
that year.212 The members declared that the primary purpose of the Committee
would be to provide its members with a regular forum for airing cooperative
approaches to the supervision of multinational banks.213 In addition to simply
recognizing the need to coordinate supervision over multinational financial
institutions, the Committee has been a model of insulated technocratic
expertise, pursuing policies internationally that individual regulators might find
impossible to implement domestically. It also offers a system of monitoring to
ensure that its members and other banking supervisors are actually
implementing at home what they represented they would do in the Committee.
This prospect of peer review and international technocratic insulation, in an
already extant committee, is likely to provide the most realistic mechanism for
stiffening the spine of would-be bureaucratic resolvers.
Since its founding, the Basel Committee has served both as the venue for
the exchange of information about supervisory practices and as the mechanism
for the promulgation of hard standards to which all members of the Committee
must subscribe. It rotates its chairmanship and operates through consensus.214
If limitations on leverage are instituted for the largest international players,
they will probably come from Basel.215 And Basel has indicated that it wants
to play a role in cross-border transactions.216

211

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
The Committee’s members come from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See About the Basel
Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm (last visited Aug. 29,
2010).
213 See Press Communiqué, Bank for Int’l Settlements (Feb. 12, 1975) [hereinafter Press Communiqué]
(on file with author); see also Joseph J. Norton, Trends in International Bank Supervision and the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 415, 415 n.1 (1994).
214 See TONY PORTER, STATES, MARKETS, AND REGIMES IN GLOBAL FINANCE 66 (1993); Joseph J.
Norton, Privatization of Public Pension Systems in Developing Nations: A Call for International Standards, 64
BROOK. L. REV. 817, 857 (1998).
215 Not least because the American leverage requirements are, while not nothing, statutorily required only
at a ratio of 15:1. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 113(a), 716.
216 This concern is emphasized in the Basel Committee’s Report and Recommendations of the CrossBorder Bank Resolution Group, which was prepared in anticipation of the G-20 Summit Meeting. See BASEL
COMMITTEE, supra note 196.
212
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In fact, financial regulators have already devised a robust international
process to deal with the problems of financial market globalization. This
process has been called upon to support existing G-20 and other international
initiatives.217 It has addressed capital requirements, increased regulation of
credit rating agencies, convergence of regulations, OTC derivatives markets,
cross-border supervisory colleges, and various other aspects of commonplace
financial regulation.
Moreover, the international networks of regulators offer something more
than soft, easily avoidable rules (though they certainly do offer such rules).
They also offer a respite from domestic politics and a competence-based
international organization in which domestic regulators can focus on better
rulemaking outside of the ambit of political control.218 In the domestic arena,
congressmen may agitate for regulatory forbearance, and the politics facing
regulators make it difficult for those regulators to pull the trigger.219
In fact, there is already some sense that operating through Basel may offer
a wider range of possibilities for revising financial regulation than would
pursuing domestic reform: on the too big to fail problem, the Committee has
suggested, for example, introducing leverage caps on banks. American
regulators have failed to propose a domestic cognate, despite the appeal of
such caps.220
With regard to resolution, moreover, the Basel Committee has already had
something to say.221 It has proposed a “middle ground approach that
217 See Zaring, Crisis Performance, supra note 39, at 495–500 (discussing the G-20’s development as a
priority-setting mechanism as one of the effects of the crisis).
218 And of course, the opportunity to avoid political pressures is one of the motivating reasons to create an
agency. See Eben Albert-Knopp, Note, The California Gas Charge and Beyond: Taxes and Fees in a
Changing Climate, 32 VT. L. REV. 217, 222 (2007) (“[A]gencies are not directly beholden to any particular
constituency and may thereby avoid some of the political pressure brought to bear on legislatures.”).
219 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
220 See Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Initiatives in Response to the Crisis by the Basel
Committee (Mar. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Initiatives], available at
http://www.bis.org/press/p090330.htm; Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, The Basel Committee Issues
Papers on Operational Risk (July 28, 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p090728.htm. The Federal
Reserve has not been able to, on its own, come up with new rules to impose leverage caps on banks, increase
their capital adequacy, or change the way that their various kinds of capital are accounted for, such as capital
based on residential mortgages without this sort of international help. See David A. Moss, Lowering the Boom
on Financial Leverage, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2010, 10:48 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
david-a-moss/lowering-the-boom-on-fina_b_471472.html (discussing “[t]he struggle for financial regulatory
reform in Washington”).
221 James Hamilton, Levitt, Volcker Stress Need for Resolution Authority for Large Financial Institutions;
Basel Urges Cross-Border Framework, CCH FINANCIAL REFORM NEWS CENTER (Sept. 24, 2009, 4:23 PM),

ZARING GALLEYSFINAL

152

10/5/2010 11:42 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

recognizes the strong possibility of ring fencing in a crisis and helps ensure
that home and host countries as well as financial institutions focus on needed
resiliency within national borders.”222 The recommendations are rooted in
fostering cooperation through “[g]reater convergence in national laws, by
promoting a common understanding, more predictability, and reliable
frameworks for responsive actions.”223 The Committee, to be sure, is by no
means perfect, but the prescription in this Article does not depend upon perfect
regulation from Basel.
3. Operation of an International Approach
The reason to resort to an international approach to resolution authority is
not because the international institutions that would perform the task are so
adept in matters of crisis response, whatever their merits as policymakers.224
Indeed, as we saw during the last crisis, the Basel Committee decides and acts
slowly, if at all, meaning that the Committee itself has little to say during fastmoving events.225 Accordingly, as a Committee, although it may be relied
upon to put some modest procedures in place for resolving future cross-border
insolvencies (and, as it does so, this is the hook on which the
internationalization of the resolution decision would lie),226 the advantage of
international organization—in this case, at least—does not lie in tasking the
decision about what to do with any particular bank to Basel. That Committee,
acting as a committee, is unlikely to be able to act; it is not itself a responsive,
crisis-ready regulator, but rather a forum for the coordination of policymaking.
But coordinating resolution authority through Basel exploits the advantage
of the international forum without depending on the forum itself to act.
(Indeed, Basel itself purports to be nothing more than a coordinator of the
interests of its members.)227 It is also an insulator from domestic pressures,
and as Robert Putnam has shown, that form of insulation can give regulators

http://www.financialcrisisupdate.com/2009/09/levitt-volcker-stress-need-for-resolution-authority-for-largefinancial-institutions-basel-urges-cross-border-framework.html.
222 BASEL COMMITTEE, supra note 196, at 19.
223 Id.
224 Zaring, Crisis Performance, supra note 39, at 478 (“[I]nternational networks, such as the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),
have not been the loci of any serious response to the crisis.”).
225 Id.
226 Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Initiatives, supra note 220.
227 Press Communiqué, supra note 213.
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flexibility.228 On this understanding, it is the independence of the global stage,
rather than the strength of the global institution, that makes it a good place for
American regulators to actually use the regulation authority that they hold.229
And so, in a crisis, one might expect the Federal Reserve to announce in Basel
a coordinated decision to resolve a cross-border institution (such as Bear
Stearns), with operations in a number of the jurisdictions overseen by members
of the Committee in conjunction with their international counterparts. The
resolution could be guided by Basel’s principles for cross-border action and
announced by American regulators in coordination with European and
Japanese counterparts. Basel here provides only substructure—the ability to
coordinate and to hold regular meetings that ensure such coordination—that
would remove the decision to resolve from the domestic context in which it has
been exercised so rarely.
This approach posits Basel, and international institutions more generally, as
a safe harbor, where regulators can contemplate their mandates somewhat
removed from the domestic political pressures that would shape those
mandates. It is not a perfect solution, but one that suggests that the
technocratic basis for seizure of a large financial intermediary is best regarded
not as a political and domestic decision, but an international one, requiring
expert judgment and a degree of multinational coordination.
Finally, an international solution to resolution authority might surpass a
unilateral American approach for other more tangential reasons. For instance,
it might forestall the World Trade Organization from acting on the basis of a
unilateral contribution of funds during the course of a resolution by
coordinating it internationally. And it might more generally foster the
recognition that financial regulation is increasingly an international matter.230

228 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L
ORG. 427 (1988).
229 Indeed, the history of Basel is replete with examples of regulators acting in ways arguably inconsistent
with the interests of their domestic industries; Japan’s willingness to accede to capital adequacy requirements
that its banks did not meet is an example. See DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING
STANDARDS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 53, 60–61 (2007).
230 The WTO law on subsidies governs any “financial contribution” made by or at the direction of “a
government or any public body within the territory of a Member,” where certain conditions are met. WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. A resolution process directed only at
domestic firms, if it enabled those institutions to acquire capital more cheaply than their competitors, might
count as a financial contribution in violation of the WTO’s subsidy disciplines, contingent upon, among other
things, a showing of serious prejudice. Id. art. 6.2.
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4. Theory and Alternatives
Of course, there are other more theoretical ways to stiffen the spine of
American financial bureaucrats in cases where large institutions become
increasingly obviously insolvent. By positing that considered resolutions will
most likely be made in the international arena, this Article suggests a doubling
down on the merits of expertise and a turn away from straightforward rewardand punishment-based incentives that could also get regulators to act.
For example, regulators could be incentivized to exercise their regulatory
authority through domestic benefits; money or leisure rewards offer the
classical incentive-based approaches. Individual regulators could receive cash
bonuses for implementing resolutions. Agencies could be awarded larger
budgets for acting to resolve troubled institutions. Additional resources offer
not just pecuniary benefits and a degree of prestige, but perhaps even the
leisure of more employees to perform the same sort of job, and so on. But
bonuses for bankrupting financial intermediaries are incentives that would
have to be carefully managed, lest they backfire. Plus, they would probably
depend on future congressional appropriations that are always uncertain. The
carrot might appear unrealistic indeed to regulators, who are told that they
might be compensated for acting against institutions that are thought to have
lobbying machines with sufficient resources in place as it is.
The other similarly unrealistic way to persuade regulators to act involves
punishment. In theory, budgets could shrink after failures to resolve, or the
powers to resolve could transfer to other agencies in the future. There is little
theoretical reason to believe that a credible threat of reorganization in the wake
of a failure to resolve would not work on the principals of the financial
regulatory agencies. But in practice, the fear of punishment meted out by
Congress or anyone else is limited.
Instead, we usually see the opposite sorts of incentives in the real world for
regulatory failure. Budgets tend to grow at institutions that have failed to catch
wrongdoers in the act.231 In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the
Securities and Exchange Commission—notably the ineffective overseers of the
large investment banks that either collapsed or reorganized during this time—

231 See, e.g., Mary K. Olson, Managing Delegation in the FDA: Reducing Delay in New-Drug Review, 29
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 397, 403 (2004) (“[I]t is difficult for politicians to credibly commit to rewarding or
punishing agency performance ex post.”).
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has seen its budget increased.232 And the problem is not just one at the agency
level. Civil service and protections make it difficult to fire employees for
failing to exercise their resolution authority, so threats of “if they are not
resolved, you are fired” would be difficult to implement.233 Accordingly, the
firm-level examiners are unlikely to find the prospect of punishment
particularly relevant should they fail to quickly and appropriately resolve
insolvent institutions.
In sum, because the stick does not seem to be any more realistic than some
of the more straightforward carrots of bonuses or budget increases for
successful exercises of resolution authority, actual use of resolution authority
will depend on a broader view of the matters that motivate agencies. One of
the original bases for the exercise of political control is the value of
independent and insulated expertise.234 The Federal Reserve, like most of the
central banks of developed countries, has been designed to exercise a strong
degree of independence from the political pressures of ordinary domestic
politics in setting monetary policy.235 Further, the belief that independent
expertise could matter is a traditional basis for bureaucratic regulation.
Richard Stewart characterized this belief as coincident with the era of the
founding of many regulatory agencies in administrative law.236 To be sure, in
Stewart’s view (and the views of others ranging from George Stigler to Ralph
Nader), modern agencies are as likely to be captured by regulated industry as
to adequately realize their regulator missions.237 And despite the fact that
stories about agency failure and capture are often more consistent with theory

232 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF: FY 2011 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 2 (2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy11congbudgjust.pdf.
233 Federal employees may generally only be fired for cause, a difficult standard to meet. See
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1934). This standard has been written into the charters
of financial regulators like the SEC. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency
Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 600 n.2 (2010) (“Although the SEC statute lacks explicit removal
language, it is ‘commonly understood’ to include a ‘for cause’ removal limitation.”).
234 For examples of proponents of these views, see GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 12–
20 (4th ed. 2007).
235 See Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 15, 18 (2006) (describing the insulation of central banks, including the Federal Reserve, from
political pressures).
236 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667
(1975) (discussing traditional model in which agencies were given independence and monitored to prevent
illegal, rather than biased, actions).
237 See Joshua Green, Inside Man, ATLANTIC, Apr. 2010, at 36 (describing the Stigler and Nader schools
of capture theory).
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than with practice,238 it may be the case that the coziness of the relationship
between the regulators and regulated, and the intensity of lobbying from
Capitol Hill, have contributed to the unwillingness of regulators to act against
insolvent financial intermediaries.239 If this is the case, the insulation from
those sorts of pressures that results from the removal of the decision-making
process to the global scene is probably the best way to get some more authority
in place. Indeed, Basel’s implemented system of peer review only bolsters its
advantages in this regard.
International interactions are no panacea, but they (1) can allow for the
deployment of expertise, (2) can build capacity among domestic regulators,
and (3) are somewhat isolated from the political process.240 While few doubt,
for example, that national champions are hard to curb by national regulators
acting alone, the international context may curb them.241 And more generally,
Putnam’s work on the flexibility afforded by international interaction holds
particularly true for the regulation of contagious problems like international
finance.242
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article is not only to offer technical solutions to problems
of resolution authority but to think more generally about the systemic
implications for governance and administration implicit in the power to
destroy. The government faces two problems when tasked with using that
power.
The first is that it will act destructively. This Article has focused on the
problem of overreach: the broad grant of power raises the threat that the
government may go too far and nationalize viable institutions, wiping out their
shareholders and removing their executives instantly and opaquely. This sort
of power—too much resolution authority—is daunting for regulated banks and
238 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915,
916 (2005) (“The kind of rampant empire-building that courts and constitutional theorists imagine would seem
to require government officials who care more about aggrandizing the institutions in which they work than
about pursuing either the interests of the citizens they represent or their own self-interest. Democratic
governments are unlikely to generate such officials.”).
239 See Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, ATLANTIC, May 2009, at 46.
240 While networks like the Basel Committee are promising, they are not always effective in the face of
crisis. See Zaring, Three Challenges, supra note 41, at 215–17 (analyzing the performance of the Basel
Committee and the International Organization of Securities Commissions after the collapse of Bear Stearns).
241 D.N. Ghosh, National Champions in the Financial Sector, 36 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 261 (2001).
242 See Putnam, supra note 228.

ZARING GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

10/5/2010 11:42 AM

A LACK OF RESOLUTION

157

thrifts, and if applied to a broader, less well-defined set of institutions, could
scare a broad swath of investors. Corporate executives might worry about
creating institutions that become so successful in the marketplace that they
become systemically significant—and accordingly nationalizable. Hence this
Article proposes addressing the overreach cases through market solutions and
pre-seizure notice and publication.243 The intuition is that if resolution
authority is broadened beyond the limitations of the bank and thrift charters,
some allowances must be made for the protection of those who risk
overweening government intrusion on their nonetheless viable institutions.
The second potential problem is that the government will not act. And
indeed, it has often failed to act in the past when it should have resolved
insolvent institutions. It has instead pursued the opposite course, permitting
them to continue to ignore the usual constraints and to take risks in a bid to
make it back to solvency.244 The failure to act is apparent from the
government’s eschewing of PCA in the most recent crisis, as this Article has
demonstrated.
There is no ideal solution to the problem of getting the government to act
when it must, but it may help to internationalize those questions of whether to
resolve. Internationalization would both insulate regulators from some of the
pressures that may prevent them from exercising their resolution powers, and
place them in the context of a forum in which the expertise of numerous
financial overseers can inform particularly serious problems. As Justice
Brandeis recognized long ago, sometimes a technocratic approach is the best
way to address particularly serious problems of government inaction because
agencies can deploy skills that courts and legislatures cannot or will not use.245
Resolution authority is a dramatic government act. But a solution that
embraces the values of international cooperation and the values of markets, in
addition to commonsense domestic administrative procedures, would make for
truly innovative financial regulation. In fact, resolution authority might
become a model for other forms of important economic regulation. In this
sense, it may act as a guide for other sorts of regulation in the future.

243

See supra Part II.
See Calomiris et al., supra note 192.
245 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 623 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting the inability
of courts to deal with highly technical subjects such as natural gas production and distribution).
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